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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 006482

FOR CHARGE YATES FROM AF/C DIRECTOR RENDER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: AMGT  
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE COUNTRY DIRECTORATE MEMORANDUM FOR ZAIRE WHICH WAS SENT TO THE OFFICE OF THE OIG.

3. BEGIN TEXT:  
JANUARY 3, 1995

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DECL: OADR

TO: OIG/AIG/ISP - JAMES K. BLUBAUGH

FROM: AF/C - ARLENE RENDER

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARRY R. MELONE  
DATE/CASE ID: 29 JAN 2001 199501706

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SUBJECT: COUNTRY DIRECTORATE MEMORANDUM FOR ZAIRE

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U.S. POLICY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN ZAIRE  
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ZAIRE'S MILITARY AND STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE UNITED STATES HAS WANED WITH THE END OF THE COLD WAR, BUT WE RETAIN IMPORTANT POLICY INTERESTS IN THE REGION. ZAIRE IS THE SECOND LARGEST COUNTRY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, AND ITS SIZE, POPULATION, AND RESOURCES MAKE IT A LINCHPIN OF REGIONAL STABILITY. THE IMPLOSION OF THE COUNTRY COULD DESTABILIZE THE ENTIRE REGION, CREATING AN INEVITABLE INCREASE IN THE FLOW OF REFUGEES, ENDANGERING THE FRAGILE MOVEMENT TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN NEIGHBORING STATES, AND TORPEDOING EFFORTS AT ECONOMIC REFORM. OUR PRINCIPAL POLICY GOAL IN ZAIRE IS TO SUPPORT ALL EFFORTS WHICH ENCOURAGE THE PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY. AS PART OF THIS, THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN ZAIRE WHICH IS MOVING THE COUNTRY -- BY FITS AND STARTS -- TOWARD THE THIRD REPUBLIC. ADDITIONALLY, THE U.S. SUPPORTS EFFORTS TO BUILD CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE AT THE GRASSROOTS IN ZAIRE.

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THE STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ZAIRE  
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PRESIDENT MOBUTU SESE SEKO HAS DOMINATED AN AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM SINCE SEIZING POWER IN A 1965 MILITARY COUP. IN 1990 THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF THE DEEPENING ECONOMIC CRISIS, DOMESTIC UNREST AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR COMPELLED MOBUTU TO ANNOUNCE THE END OF THE ONE PARTY STATE, INITIATING ZAIRE'S "TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY." THIS PROCESS REMAINS INCOMPLETE OVER FOUR YEARS LATER. A NATIONAL CONFERENCE (CNS) INVESTIGATED OFFICIAL WRONGDOING, DRAFTED A NEW CONSTITUTION, AND SELECTED ETIENNE TSHISEKEDI WA MULUMBA, MOBUTU'S MOST IMPLACABLE POLITICAL FOE, AS TRANSITION PRIME MINISTER. HOWEVER, MOBUTU CONTESTED TSHISEKEDI'S AUTHORITY AS PRIME MINISTER, AND TOOK ACTIONS TO CHALLENGE THE DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE. MOBUTU DISMISSED TSHISEKEDI IN 1993 AND APPOINTED A DEFECTOR FROM TSHISEKEDI'S OWN UNION FOR DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS (UDPS) PARTY TO RUN A

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PARALLEL GOVERNMENT. TSHISEKEDI REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE MOBUTU'S AUTHORITY TO REMOVE HIM FROM OFFICE. THE RESULTING "DOUBLING" OF GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS PERSISTED THROUGH JUNE 1994, WHILE MOST OF THE BASIC FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT GROUND TO A HALT.

IN MID-1994, MOBUTU AND OPPOSITION LEADERS FINALLY NEGOTIATED AN END TO THE POLITICAL IMPASSE AND ESTABLISHED A TRANSITION PARLIAMENT (THE HCR-PT) WHICH ELECTED THE OPPOSITION UNION OF INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATS

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(UDI) PARTY'S KENGO WA DONDO AS TRANSITION PRIME MINISTER. UNDER THE AGREEMENT, MINISTERIAL POSITIONS ARE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN MOBUTU SUPPORTERS AND THE OPPOSITION. THE UDPS AND SOME SMALLER OPPOSITION CONTINUE TO INSIST ON TSHISEKEDI'S LEGITIMACY AND REFUSE TO ACCEPT KENGO'S ELECTION OR THE PORTFOLIOS RESERVED FOR THEM.

THROUGHOUT MUCH OF ZAIRE'S LENGTHY -- AND INCOMPLETE -- TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, THE STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS HAS BEEN DIFFICULT. THE UNITED STATES CUT OFF SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRE IN 1990, AND WE SUSPENDED DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE UNDER BROOKE AMENDMENT SANCTIONS IN 1991. THE AID MISSION TO ZAIRE HAS SINCE BEEN CLOSED, ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ( 12 MILLION IN FY-94), WORKING EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH NGOS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE UNHCR. A MILITARY MUTINY IN KINSHASA IN SEPTEMBER 1991 FORCED THE EVACUATION OF MOST OF THE EXPATRIATE POPULATION, INCLUDING A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL AND ALL DEPENDENTS. THE EMBASSY, WHICH AT ONE TIME WAS THE FIFTH LARGEST U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE MISSION IN THE WORLD, HAS BEEN REDUCED TO A RUMP PRESENCE OF 39 AMERICAN DIRECT HIRE PERSONNEL. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CONSULATE GENERAL IN LUBUMBASHI SUSPENDED OPERATIONS. IN MARCH 1993, UPON THE DEPARTURE FROM POST OF AMBASSADOR MELISSA WELLS, WE INFORMED PRESIDENT MOBUTU THAT WE WOULD NOT SEND ANOTHER ENVOY UNTIL HE PERMITTED THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY TO PROCEED. SINCE THAT TIME, THE U.S. HAS BEEN ABLY REPRESENTED BY JOHN YATES AS PERMANENT CHARGE D'AFFAIRES.

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AS A MEASURE OF U.S. DISPLEASURE FOR MOBUTU'S OBSTRUCTIVE TACTICS, THE UNITED STATES IMPOSED AN EMBARGO IN APRIL 1993 ON THE EXPORT OF U.S.-ORIGIN COMMERCIAL WEAPONRY TO ZAIRE. IN JUNE 1993, PRESIDENT CLINTON SIGNED A PROCLAMATION SUSPENDING THE ISSUANCE OF VISAS TO ZAIRIANS WHO "FORMULATE, IMPLEMENT, OR BENEFIT FROM POLICIES THAT IMPEDE ZAIRE'S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY," AND TO THE IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS OF SUCH PERSONS. THE MEASURE, PRIMARILY AIMED AT MOBUTU AND HIS ENTOURAGE, HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE IN RESTRICTING THE ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES OF ALL ZAIRIANS WHO BLOCK ZAIRE'S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY. THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS, WITH WHOM WE COOPERATE CLOSELY ON ZAIRE POLICY, HAVE MAINTAINED A SIMILAR -- IF LESS RESTRICTIVE -- VISA SANCTION.

THE JUNE 14 ELECTION OF KENGO WA DONDO AS PRIME MINISTER BY ZAIRE'S TRANSITION PARLIAMENT OFFERED THE PROSPECT OF A MARKEDLY CHANGED BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. AFTER A LONG PERIOD WITH LITTLE CONTACT WITH MOBUTU'S PUPPET GOVERNMENT, THE EMBASSY MOVED TO RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT HEADED BY PRIME MINISTER KENGO. THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN COOPERATIVE ON A RANGE OF ISSUES, RANGING FROM THE U.S. HUMANITARIAN OPERATION IN EASTERN ZAIRE TO RELIEVE THE REFUGEE CRISIS TO ACCREDITATION OF THE U.S. DEFENSE ATTACHE TO SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. POSITION ON THE PRESIDENCY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO). IN TURN, THE UNITED STATES HAS SOUGHT WAYS TO DEMONSTRATE PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR KENGO'S AMBITIOUS PROGRAM OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM, WHILE MAINTAINING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRESSURE ON MOBUTU TO

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COOPERATE WITH THE TRANSITION. THE ARMS EMBARGO AND THE VISA SANCTION HAVE REMAINED IN PLACE, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE MADE THE DECISION TO SEND A U.S. AMBASSADOR BACK TO ZAIRE (AS A MEASURE OF SUPPORT FOR KENGO).

THE U.S. SUPPORTED KENGO'S EFFORTS TO STAUNCH THE IMPORTATION OF ILLEGAL CURRENCY INTO THE COUNTRY BY MOBUTU'S ENTOURAGE, PUSHED THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK TO ENGAGE IN ZAIRE, AND URGED THE FUND TO DELAY CONSIDERATION OF SUSPENSION OF ZAIRE FOR ANOTHER SIX MONTHS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE GOZ WITH TIME TO MEET IFI

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CONDITIONALITY. WE HAVE ISSUED STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF KENGO'S REFORM EFFORTS, AND HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE REGARD HIS GOVERNMENT AS LEGITIMATE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE PRESSED KENGO TO PURSUE A LIMITED AGENDA, AND TO FOCUS ON ECONOMIC REFORM, AN INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK, AND A REALISTIC CALENDAR FOR CREDIBLE AND TRANSPARENT ELECTIONS. ADDITIONALLY, WE HAVE EMPHASIZED TO ALL PARTIES IN ZAIRE THE IMPORTANCE OF RADICAL OPPOSITION LEADER ETIENNE TSHISEKEDI'S INCLUSION IN THE PROCESS.

LEGISLATIVE AND BUDGETARY RESTRICTIONS LIMIT THE TYPE AND AMOUNT OF U.S. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRE. WE HAVE EXPLAINED THIS TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS KEY ADVISORS, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT KENGO EXPECTS THE UNITED STATES TO OFFER CONCRETE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE -- EVEN IF THIS MEANS THE PROVISION OF FUNDING FOR ZAIRE'S ELECTIONS THROUGH NGOS. RELATIONS WITH THE GOZ COULD BE STRAINED OVER THIS ISSUE -- PARTICULARLY IF KENGO MAKES GOOD ON HIS THREAT TO RESIGN IF ZAIRE'S TRADITIONAL PARTNERS DO NOT MATCH SUPPORT WITH FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.

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POLICY AND PROGRAM GOALS: PROCESS, PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS  
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IN ADDITION TO SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN ZAIRE, U.S. POLICY AND PROGRAM GOALS INCLUDE THE PROTECTION OF THE LIVES AND PROPERTY OF OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE U.S. CITIZENS, AND THE ALLEVIATION OF THE MULTIPLE HUMANITARIAN CRISES WHICH AFFLICT ZAIRE. THE ELABORATION OF THESE GOALS IS ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH DIALOG WITHIN AF, INTERAGENCY DISCUSSIONS, AND COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT AND EMBASSY KINSHASA. UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND HIS PRINCIPAL DAS, AF/C HAS FIRST LINE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FORMULATION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD ZAIRE.

THE OCTOBER 1993 INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP (IWG) ON ZAIRE ESTABLISHED THE BROAD FRAMEWORK OF THE DIRECTION OF U.S. POLICY. AF/C, WITH INPUT FROM THE EMBASSY, DRAFTED THE BACKGROUND PAPERS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE IWG; WE ALSO DREW UP THE IWG CONCLUSIONS. THESE CONCLUSIONS HAVE PROVIDED THE POLICY DIRECTION ON ZAIRE FOR MORE THAN A YEAR. WE WRITE QUARTERLY STRATEGY PAPERS

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WHICH ASSESS THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF THE IWG CONCLUSIONS, AND OUTLINE MODIFICATIONS BASED UPON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN-COUNTRY. THE EMBASSY READS THESE PAPERS IN DRAFT, AND WE MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO FOLD MISSION COMMENT INTO THE FINAL PRODUCT. ADDITIONALLY, THE EMBASSY HAS PROVIDED IN THE PAST YEAR A REGULAR STREAM OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH HAVE INFLUENCED

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OUR APPROACH TO ZAIRE AND OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS.

EMBASSY KINSHASA HAS DONE A GENERALLY SUPERB JOB IN IMPLEMENTING UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ZAIRE. DESPITE A DIFFICULT WORKING ENVIRONMENT -- INCLUDING TWO MAJOR MILITARY MUTINIES IN THE CAPITAL IN 1991 AND 1993 -- THE EMBASSY HAS MANAGED A MAJOR EVACUATION AND DRAWDOWN, PROTECTED AND PRESERVED USG RESOURCES, MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH THE PRIVATE AMCIT COMMUNITY, AND KEPT ALL AMERICANS APPRISED OF THE SECURITY SITUATION. WHEN THE RWANDAN CRISIS ERUPTED INTO AN UNPRECEDENTED INFUX OF REFUGEES INTO EASTERN ZAIRE, THE EMBASSY RESPONDED PROMPTLY WITH THE DISPATCH OF SENIOR PERSONNEL TO ASSESS THE SITUATION, LIAISE WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS, NGOS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND TO ASSURE THE SAFETY OF AMERICANS RESIDENT IN THE AREA. THE CONSULAR OFFICER UNDERTOOK A TRIP TO THE REGION IN DECEMBER TO REVIEW THE WARDEN LIST, RENEW CONTACT WITH PRIVATE AMCITS, AND UPDATE THE EMBASSY EAP.

IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. OBJECTIVE TO ADDRESS ZAIRE'S MULTIPLE HUMANITARIAN CRISES, THE EMBASSY HAS PROVIDED COMPREHENSIVE AND TIMELY REPORTING ON THE FAR-FLUNG FLASHPOINTS IN THE COUNTRY. FREQUENT TELEGRAPHIC TRIP REPORTS TO SHABA, THE KIVUS, AND THE TWO KASAIS OUTLINED THE EXTENT OF INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE AND ETHNIC CLEANSING IN ZAIRE'S INTERIOR IN 1993. ADDITIONALLY, THE AID REPRESENTATIVE -- AND AFTER THE AID CLOSEOUT IN JUNE 1994, THE PERMANENTLY-ASSIGNED OFDA OFFICER -- MAINTAINED CLOSE AND FREQUENT CONTACT WITH

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NGOS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO ENSURE THAT

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WASHINGTON HAD A CLEAR PICTURE OF THE EXTENT OF THE CRISIS. ADDITIONALLY, AS A RESULT OF AN EMBASSY INITIATIVE, AN EXPERIENCED AID EMPLOYEE ON TDY WAS EXTENDED AND ASSIGNED TO AID'S REGIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM WHICH COVERED THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN CENTRAL AFRICA.

THE EMBASSY PERFORMED ADMIRABLY IN SUPPORT OF U.S. EFFORTS TO ADVANCE ZAIRE'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION. THE CHARGE MAINTAINED FREQUENT CONTACT WITH HIS FRENCH AND BELGIAN COUNTERPARTS, AND PARTICIPATED IN DEMARCHES WITH HIS COLLEAGUES ON MOBUTU, OPPOSITION LEADER ETIENNE TSHISEKEDI, TRANSITION PARLIAMENT PRESIDENT ARCHBISHOP MONSENGWO. THE EMBASSY'S INPUT WAS PARTICULARLY USEFUL IN DECEMBER 1993, AS THE FRENCH-BELGIAN-US TROIKA MOVED TOWARD A JOINT DEMARCHE ON MOBUTU AND TSHISEKEDI. EMBASSY REPORTING ON THE FRACTIOUS OPPOSITION'S DECISION TO SUSPEND NEGOTIATIONS ON A POLITICAL COMPROMISE WITH MOBUTU INFLUENCED THE TOUGH MESSAGE THE THREE ULTIMATELY DELIVERED TO THE TSHISEKEDI.

FROM THE WASHINGTON PERSPECTIVE, THE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLES WHICH THE EMBASSY ENCOUNTERED IN FULFILLING ITS MISSION RELATE TO STAFFING. FOLLOWING THE EVACUATION IN SEPTEMBER 1991, KINSHASA OPERATED FOR MORE THAN A YEAR UNDER ORDERED DEPARTURE; MINOR DEPENDENTS WERE ONLY PERMITTED TO RETURN TO POST IN MAY 1993. AS A RESULT OF THIS DISRUPTION, KINSHASA SUFFERED A RASH OF STAFFING GAPS (INCLUDING AN EIGHT MONTH GAP IN THE DCM POSITION), AND THE DEPARTMENT HAD TO STRETCH SEVERAL OFFICERS INTO

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KEY JOBS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL FOR THE MISSION. AS ANOTHER PALLIATIVE MEASURE, THE DEPARTMENT AGREED TO SPECIAL TWELVE MONTH ASSIGNMENTS FOR PERSONNEL WHO AGREED TO SERVE IN KINSHASA. DURING ONE PERIOD OVER THE SUMMER OF 1994, ONE 02 POLITICAL OFFICER WAS THE ONLY PERSON TO STAFF A THREE PERSON POLITICAL SECTION -- A PERIOD WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE EAST AND THE ADVENT OF THE KENGO GOVERNMENT. THE DEPARTMENT ATTEMPTED TO IDENTIFY TDY PERSONNEL TO CLOSE THE GAP IN KINSHASA, BUT THE EXIGENCIES OF REOPENING EMBASSY KIGALI AND A BURGEONING CRISIS IN BURUNDI MEANT THAT KINSHASA HAD TO "MAKE DO." THEY DID RIGHT WELL, AND IN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES.

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FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT OF POST PERFORMANCE  
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AS I HAVE INDICATED ABOVE, OUR POLICY IN ZAIRE HAS BEEN INFLUENCED BY THE EXTREME CRISIS IN THE SUBREGION AND THE COUNTRY'S INTERNAL POLITICAL TURMOIL. THE SUDDEN DEATHS IN A PLANE CRASH OF THE PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI, THE OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR IN RWANDA, AND THE MASSIVE AND UNPRECEDENTED REFUGEE OUTFLOW INTO ZAIRE IN JULY FOLLOWING THE CAPTURE OF KIGALI BY THE TUTSI-DOMINATED RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT PLACED EXTRAORDINARY DEMANDS UPON EMBASSY KINSHASA. THE TURMOIL ON ZAIRE'S BORDERS WAS MIRRORED BY THE ONGOING POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE COUNTRY'S LONG TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: A RUPTURE IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE OPPOSITION AND THE SUPPORTERS OF PRESIDENT MOBUTU, PRESIDENTIAL POWER PLAYS

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TO FORCE HIS OPPONENTS TO CLOSURE, THE EXPANSION OF ZAIRE'S HIGH COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE BIRTH OF ITS TRANSITION PARLIAMENT, LONG AND FRACTIOUS DISCUSSIONS ON THE TRANSITION CONSTITUTION, AND FINALLY (AND PERHAPS IMPROBABLY), THE EMERGENCE OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT HEADED BY FORMER MOBUTU ALLY AND BORN AGAIN OPPOSITION LEADER KENGO WA DONDO.

EMBASSY KINSHASA'S REPORTING AND ANALYSIS OF THESE ISSUES WAS GENERALLY SUPERB. THE EMBASSY DEFTLY AND FAITHFULLY CHRONICLED THE POLITICAL MACHINATIONS WHICH HAVE CHARACTERIZED ZAIRE'S TRANSITION, AND THE EMBASSY SUGGESTED -- AND THEN DELIVERED ON -- POLICY GUIDANCE TO REMIND MOBUTU OF OUR EXPECTATIONS AND STRENGTHEN KENGO'S POSITION. PERHAPS MOST IMPRESSIVELY, THE EMBASSY REACTED IMMEDIATELY TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN EASTERN ZAIRE, REDEPLOYED LIMITED RESOURCES, AND KEPT WASHINGTON INFORMED OF EVENTS WHILE MANAGING A SUCCESSION OF HIGH LEVEL USG VISITORS, CODELS AND PRIVATE DELEGATIONS.

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POLITICAL REPORTING  
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ZAIRE'S TORTUOUS TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY CONTINUES, AND EMBASSY KINSHASA PROVIDED ABSOLUTELY FIRST RATE REPORTING AND ANALYSIS OF THE FITS AND STARTS,

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BACKSTABBING, DOUBLE CROSSING, AND RELATED POLITICAL  
PETTIFOGGERY LEADING TO THE ELECTION OF TRANSITION PRIME  
MINISTER KENGO WA DONDO. KINSHASA CABLES IN NOVEMBER AND  
DECEMBER 1993 GAVE SOLID RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S.

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PARTICIPANTS AT THE WASHINGTON TRILATERAL, THEN OUTLINED  
THE DEPRESSING SPECTACLE OF THE BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS  
BETWEEN THE OPPOSITION HOLY UNION AND THE MOBUTUISTS AND  
THE SLOW DANCE AROUND THE ISSUE OF RESUMPTION OF  
DIALOGUE. COVERAGE OF THIS TOPIC WAS EXHAUSTIVE YET  
ADMIRABLY CONCISE AND WELL-WRITTEN. THE BREADTH AND  
DEPTH OF THE REPORTING DEMONSTRATED THE TREMENDOUS ACCESS  
THAT THE EMBASSY HAS DEVELOPED WITH PLAYERS ACROSS THE  
POLITICAL SPECTRUM IN KINSHASA.

THE ADVENT OF KENGO WA DONDO AS ZAIRE'S TRANSITION  
PRIME MINISTER MODIFIED THE POLITICAL EQUATION IN ZAIRE,  
AND OFFERED THE U.S. THE PROSPECT OF A MARKEDLY CHANGED  
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. BEFORE AND AFTER KENGO'S  
ELECTION, EMBASSY KINSHASA CONTINUED ITS PRO-ACTIVE  
ENGAGEMENT IN THE ZAIRIAN DIALECTIC. A CABLE ON THE  
TROIKA EFFORT TO INFLUENCE THE ZAIRIAN OPPOSITION TO  
REUNITE BEHIND A SINGLE CANDIDATE FOR PRIME MINISTER WAS  
AN EXCELLENT SUMMARY OF THE DIVERGENT AGENDAS OF ZAIRE'S  
FRACTIOUS OPPOSITION. THE EMBASSY FOLLOWED THIS WITH A  
SERIES OF CAREFULLY-CONSIDERED MESSAGES ON KENGO, HIS  
POLITICAL PROGRAM, AND THE COMPOSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

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ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REPORTING  
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KINSHASA ANTICIPATED WASHINGTON'S NEEDS, AND  
PROVIDED EXCELLENT COVERAGE OF KENGO'S STRUGGLES TO  
ASSERT HIS AUTHORITY OVER THE ECONOMY, THE BATTLE WITH  
THE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR, AND THE SINISTER INFLUX OF  
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ILLEGAL CURRENCY INTO THE COUNTRY. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S  
PERCEPTION OF KENGO, AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S RECEPTION  
IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON WAS INFORMED AND INFLUENCED --  
WITH THE CONCOMITANT EFFECT ON U.S. POLICY IN ZAIRE -- BY

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KINSHASA'S COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT OF KENGO'S COURAGEOUS EFFORTS TO TURN OFF THE SPIGOT OF ILLEGAL BANKNOTES.

THE ABSENCE OF RELIABLE STATISTICS IN ZAIRE HAMPERED THE EMBASSY'S ABILITY TO ANALYZE IN DEPTH THE SORRY STATE OF THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY. NONETHELESS, KINSHASA PROVIDED SOLID ANECDOTAL AND SPOT REPORTING ON ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ISSUES. THE SECTION ON THE ECONOMY IN KINSHASA'S WIDELY-READ WEEKLY REPORT IS ALSO VERY USEFUL, AS IS THE MONTHLY COST OF LIVING SURVEY. THE DEARTH OF REPORTING ON GECAMINES OFFERS STARK TESTIMONY TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE ONCE-MIGHTY COPPER AND COBALT PARASTATAL. KINSHASA'S REPORTS ON THE DIAMOND TRADE, HOWEVER, WERE COPIOUS, LIVELY, AND PACKED WITH USEFUL INFORMATION. WE HAVE SUGGESTED TO THE EMBASSY THAT EVERY SIX MONTHS IT TRY TO DO AN ECONOMIC WRAP-UP CABLE COVERING FISCAL, MONETARY, EXPORT INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENTS, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, ETC., WITH WHATEVER SUMMARY STATISTICS ARE AVAILABLE IN ZAIRE (IF ANY).

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MILITARY AFFAIRS  
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AS I NOTED EARLIER, MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRE HAS BEEN SUSPENDED SINCE 1990. THE DEFENSE ATTACHE'S JOB WAS COMPLICATED THROUGHOUT MOST OF 1993 AND 1994 BY THE

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ISSUE OF ACCREDITATION. THE U.S. HAD REFUSED TO GIVE A VISA TO THE PROSPECTIVE ZAIRIAN DATT (OVER THE SUBSTANTIAL DEBT OF ZAIRE'S MISSIONS TO WASHINGTON AND THE UN), AND THE GOZ RETALIATED BY A REFUSAL TO FORMALLY ACCREDIT THE U.S. DATT. THE KENGO GOVERNMENT, IN A SIGN OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, REVERSED THIS DECISION IN THE FALL OF 1994, AND THE U.S. DATT IS NOW ACCREDITED (THERE WAS NO QUID PRO QUO, AND THE PROSPECTIVE ZAIRIAN DATT REMAINS WITHOUT VISA). AT ANY RATE, ACCREDITED OR NOT, THE KINSHASA DAO ATTEMPTED TO CHRONICLE THE ALLEGED UNITA RE-SUPPLY FLIGHTS FROM KINSHASA'S NDJILI AIRPORT. ADDITIONALLY, DIA-SOURCED REPORTS FROM EASTERN ZAIRE DURING THE REFUGEE CRISIS WERE MOST USEFUL IN FIGURING OUT WHAT THE FORMER RWANDAN MILITARY AND EX-INTERIM GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE PLANNING.

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CONSULAR MANAGEMENT  
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THE U.S. VISA SANCTION INVOLVED KINSHASA'S CONSULAR OPERATION DIRECTLY IN A KEY PART OF OUR POLICY TOWARD ZAIRE. WHILE THE VISA WORKLOAD IN KINSHASA, BY CA'S STANDARDS, IS A LIGHT ONE, THE COMPLEXITY OF ENFORCING THE VISA SANCTION ADDED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE WORK OF VISA ADJUDICATION IN ZAIRE. FROM AF/C'S PERSPECTIVE, THE CONSULAR SECTION PERFORMED IN OUTSTANDING FASHION: POST SUBMITTED THE REQUIRED VISA ADVISORY CABLES IN A TIMELY FASHION, THE MESSAGES WERE WELL-WRITTEN AND ON TARGET WITH THE INFORMATION WASHINGTON NEEDED TO MAKE A DECISION ON THE APPLICABILITY

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OF THE PROCLAMATION. AT THE SAME TIME, KINSHASA'S H PASS MESSAGES WERE MODELS OF RESPONSIVENESS (AND THE DRAFTING WAS EXTREMELY GOOD), AND AF/C APPRECIATED KINSHASA'S WELL-REASONED RESPONSES TO THE EFFORTS OF VARIOUS MOBUTU CRONIES TO SECURE VISAS AT OTHER POSTS. A CABLE TO NOUAKCHOTT ("JUST SAY NO") SHOULD BE USED IN CONGEN ROSSLYN AS A TRAINING EXERCISE FOR JUNIOR CONSULAR OFFICERS.

AS I HAVE INDICATED, THE VISA SANCTION IS AN IMPORTANT PLANK OF OUR OVERALL POLICY TOWARD ZAIRE, BUT IT IS PERHAPS THE MOST DIFFICULT PART OF U.S. POLICY TO EXPLAIN OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. A CABLE FROM KINSHASA ("ZAIRE AND THE 212(F) VISA PROCLAMATION: FROM GENESIS TO REVELATION IN A FEW MONTHS") WAS AN ABSOLUTELY FIRST RATE ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SANCTION. THE CABLE'S ARGUMENTS HAD WIDE EFFECT, AND HAVE FORMED THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR EVERY DISCUSSION OF THE TOPIC IN THE DEPARTMENT, AT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, ON THE HILL, AND WITH THE PRIVATE AMERICAN (AND ZAIRIAN) COMMUNITY.

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
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THE REVIVAL OF OUR USIS OPERATION HAS BEEN ANOTHER FEATURE OF EMBASSY KINSHASA'S STRONG PERFORMANCE IN THE PAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS. USIS ONLY RETURNED TO FULL OPERATION DURING THE SUMMER OF 1993. SINCE THAT TIME

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USIS HAS RELAUNCHED AN ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROGRAM,  
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CONDUCTED AN ACTIVE AND SUCCESSFUL INTERNATIONAL VISITOR  
PROGRAM, DEVELOPED A USIA COUNTRY PLAN FOR ZAIRE, AND  
MADE AN AGGRESSIVE (AND SUCCESSFUL) EFFORT TO ORGANIZE  
PROGRAMS WHICH INFORM ZAIRIANS ABOUT THE U.S. DEMOCRATIC  
EXPERIMENT, AND BRING TOGETHER ZAIRIANS OF DIVERGENT  
POLITICAL VIEWS. THE USIS OFFICER PLAYS AN ACTIVE ROLE  
IN KINSHASA'S DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM, AND HAS  
EXTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH THE ZAIRIAN OFFICIAL AND  
OPPOSITION PRESS AND WITH A NUMBER OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND  
OTHER COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS.

4. END TEXT.  
CHRISTOPHER

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