JOINT STATE-OSD MEMORANDUM CONCERNING
PEACEKEEPING IN RWANDA AND THE CRITERIA OF PRD-13

A. THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Criterion Met: Yes

The civil war in Rwanda has displaced one million people from the northern portion of the country, and only massive humanitarian assistance (estimated at $100 million this year) has prevented widespread famine. The war has produced thousands of military and civilian casualties and has sparked episodes of ethnic violence, with the continuing threat of ethnic massacres -- a recurring problem in the region. These conditions clearly qualify as a humanitarian disaster requiring urgent action, coupled with violence and the threat of future violence.

B. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF INTEREST FOR DEALING
WITH THE PROBLEM ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS

Criterion Met: Yes, but an international consensus does not exist yet on the specific means required to resolve the problem.

The UN, the OAU, and several regional and Western powers have displayed a common interest in resolving this problem, through both multilateral diplomatic means and through participation in multinational military observer missions. The OAU and Tanzania have sponsored year-long peace talks, with the UN, U.S., France, Belgium, Germany, and neighboring African countries participating as active observers. The UN recently approved a Rwanda/Uganda border-monitoring force and is studying further action, and the OAU has fielded a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) to monitor the ceasefire.
Although an international community of interest exists regarding the need for a positive resolution to the civil war, a consensus still needs to be developed among members of the UN Security Council and the broader international community about the specific means to accomplish that objective. In addition, countries which have been actively involved in the peace process have differing approaches to the problem.

C. CLEAR OBJECTIVES, UNDERSTANDING OF MISSION'S CHARACTER

Criterion Met: Probably, if the mission and objectives are well-defined in the peace accord and approving resolution.

As currently envisioned, the proposed Neutral International Force (NIF) would fit a traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping model, assuming the force is blue-helmeted.

- Both sides have requested and consented to the force
- A ceasefire is in place and has been holding since March
- Hostilities have been suspended and the parties are already separated by a buffer zone monitored by the UNMOG

The primary mandate of the NIF would be to assure implementation of the peace accords. The force would keep the parties apart, supervise cantonment and disarmament of troops, store heavy equipment, and oversee force integration and demobilization.

If the situation deteriorated and peace enforcement became necessary, it is not clear that the UN would have the will or resources to respond adequately.

If the operation were not blue-helmeted, it is not clear that all parties would consent or that peace could be maintained. This could significantly alter the proposed force objectives and the character of the mission.
D. MEANS AVAILABLE

Criterion Met: No, not at this time

While it might be possible to gain adequate financial and troop support for a Rwandan peacekeeping mission, the means are not clearly available at this point. Generating them from the international community would require a significant investment of U.S. effort.

The two sides have been discussing an international force of about 2,500 men. The estimated cost of such a force, at UN reimbursement rates, would be roughly $37 million for one year. Assuming an assessed UN operation, no financial resources currently exist to pay the U.S. assessment; our only option would be to increase our arrears. (In addition, goods and services could be made available through the UN Participation Act.)

Russian officials have suggested funding the force through voluntary contributions. If a voluntary fund were established, it is unclear who would contribute and in what amounts.

To provide assistance to a non-assessed operation, we might tap FY-93 fallout FMF funds, if available; however, there will be numerous claimants for these scarce funds. In addition, we might be able to move funds into the non-assessed security assistance peacekeeping account utilizing FAA transfer authority. Further, if there are funds available in DoD, it might be possible to provide commitments in kind (goods, services, and personnel).

The availability of funding would directly affect the likelihood of attracting necessary force contributions. The OAU already has a small contingent in Rwanda, which they plan to expand to 240 men. However, African nations may not want to
contribute additional troops unless they are reimbursed at UN rates, and it would be difficult to raise sufficient voluntary funds to provide more than "at cost" reimbursement. At present, aside from the African countries participating or expected to participate in the NMOG, only Canada has expressed an interest in contributing troops in Rwanda. Other possible sources of troops still need to be examined.

Adequate means might be found if the peacekeeping force were small enough. We are currently examining options for a more modest PKO. The Russians might accept an assessed operation for the UN portion, which would not add significantly to U.S. arrears. Alternatively, it would be easier to raise voluntary funds for such an operation.

Whatever the cost of the peacekeeping mission, it must be weighed against the cost of doing nothing. Estimates for humanitarian assistance to the displaced this year alone exceed $100 million, with the U.S. having already contributed or pledged over $34 million. A successful peacekeeping operation would allow the displaced to return home, thereby significantly reducing current humanitarian relief costs and obviating the need for future relief.