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P 061502Z NOV 92  
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2191  
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.  
(X) Release ( ) Excise ( ) Deny (X) Declassify  
Date 9/18/98 Exemption \_\_\_\_\_

SECTION 01 OF 04 KIGALI 04614

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW  
SUBJECT: ARUSHA NEGOTIATIONS: INTERNAL DEBATE

REF: KIGALI 4527 ✓

1. [REDACTED]
2. SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH INTERNAL DIALOGUE FINALLY BEGAN NOVEMBER 3 WITH A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDE

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AND THE FIVE PARTIES IN THE GOVERNMENT, BOTH HABYARIMANA AND KANYARENGWE HAVE EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE PEACE PROCESS. RELIGIOUS LEADERS WERE NO INVOLVED IN THE NOVEMBER 3 MEETING, BUT ARE NOW BEI ENGAGED FOR NEXT WEEK'S ROUND OF INTERNAL TALKS. T MRND MET NOVEMBER 4 TO DEBATE THE ARUSHA PROTOCOL, CRITICIZED ARTICLES 14, 21 AND 46, BUT REPORTEDLY AGREED TO WORK WITH THE PROTOCOL AND NOT FORCE THE GOVERNMENT TO RENEGOTIATE THE PROBLEM ISSUES. THE KEY ISSUES REMAIN THE COMPOSITION OF THE TRANSITION

GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY WHETHER THE CDR WILL BE INCLUDED, AND CLEANING UP THE TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, ESPECIALLY THE BOURGEMESTRES IN ORD TO REACH AGREEMENT ON ELECTIONS TO END THE TRANSITI PERIOD. WE AND OTHER EMBASSIES CONTINUE TO ENCOURA INTERNAL DIALOGUE AND TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE COMPROMIS PROCEDURES TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK. END SUMMARY.

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A MOOD OF PESSIMISM  
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3. ACCORDING TO OPPOSITION PARTY LEADERS WHO WERE THERE, PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA TOLD THE PARTIES IN AN EIGHT-HOUR MEETING NOVEMBER 3 THAT HE DID NOT BELIE THAT THE WAR WOULD END. MDR LEADER TWAGIRAMUNGU TO ME THAT RPF CHAIRMAN KANYARENGWE SAID THE SAME THIN TO TWAGIRAMUNGU ON THE PHONE THE SAME DAY. ADDING THE OPPOSITIONS LEADERS' PESSIMISM WAS A STATEMENT THEY ATTRIBUTED TO HABYARIMANA TO THE EFFECT THAT T PRESIDENT DID NOT FEEL THAT THE COUNTRY WAS COMMITT

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BY THE SIGNATURE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO ALL OF THE PARTS OF THE ARUSHA ACCORD. (THIS APPROACH TO THE ACCORD WAS FORESHADOWED BY RUHIGIRA IN REFTEL.)

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THE NOVEMBER 3 MEETING  
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
4. THE MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FIVE PARTIES IN THE GOVERNME NOVEMBER 3 RESULTED IN NO AGREEMENT EXCEPT A LOOSE COMMITMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO MEET SOMETIME AGAIN.

5. INVITED TO THE MEETING WERE THE LEADERS OF MDR, PL, PSD, PDC AND MRND. THE FIRST TWO WERE REPRESENTED BY THEIR PRESIDENTS ACCOMPANIED BY THREE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES. PDC WAS REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT ONLY. PSD HAD TWO REPRESENTATIVES, AND MRND HAD AT LEAST FOUR. ALSO PRESENT WAS THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND THE DIRECT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CABINET. NO PROGRESS WAS MADE O THE KEY ISSUES OF THE SHAPE OF A NEW TRANSITION


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GOVERNMENT AND A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON AN ALL-PARTY MEETING WITH THE RPF. PARTY LEADERS GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT ALTOGETHER COMMITTED TO THE RESULTS OF THE ARUSHA TALKS, AND HE AGAIN USED WITH THEM HIS FAVORITE FEAR, THAT AN ARUSHA AGREEMENT THAT GAVE T MUCH TO THE RPF WOULD TRANSFER THE WAR ON THE BORDE INTO A CIVIL WAR INSIDE.



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6. ALTHOUGH THE GAME PLAN HAD CALLED FOR RELIGIOUS LEADERS TO PARTICIPATE, THEY WERE NOT PRESENT, AND MENTION WAS MADE OF THEIR POSSIBLE FACILITATOR'S RO IN THE FUTURE. SUBSEQUENTLY BOTH THIS EMBASSY AND THE PAPAL NUNCIO HAVE BEEN REQUESTED TO HELP BRING RELIGIOUS LEADERS INTO THE PROCESS. AS OF THIS WRITING, BOTH THE PRESIDENCY AND THE PARTIES ARE IN CONTACT WITH THE CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT RELIGIOUS LEADERS. THE LATTER ARE SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH PARTIES ON NOVEMBER 11 AND ARE EXPECTED TO HOLD



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P 061502Z NOV 92  
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2192  
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
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AMEMBASSY KAMPALA  
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
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INFORMAL MEETINGS IN THE MEANTIME.

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INTERNAL SECURITY  
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7. THE PARTIES CLAIM THEY FORCED THE PRESIDENT TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF INTERNAL SECURITY. THEY LINKED THIS QUESTION TO THE CONTINUATION OF MRND BOURGEMESTRES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE CABINET AGAIN ADDRESSED THIS ISSUE LAST WEEK, AND FAILED TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON EVEN THE LIMITED SHUFFLING BOURGEMESTRE POSTS PROPOSED BY THE NONPARTISA COMMISSION ON TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION. THE CABINET COMMUNIQUE SAID THAT THE ISSUE HAD BEEN PUT OFF FOR ANOTHER MEETING. PARTY LEADERS TOLD ME THA THE MRND HAD DEFINITELY REJECTED THE COMMISSION'S REPORT. PARTY LEADERS INSIST THAT BY REFUSING TO REMOVE BOURGEMESTRES SUCH AS GATETE AND RAMBUKA, WH ARE KNOWN THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AS HAVING BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR MASSACRES, THE PRESIDENT IS IN FACT SENDING THE MESSAGE THAT HE SUPPORTS THEIR ACTION.

8. THE PARTIES HAVE NOW MADE THE REPLACEMENT OF BOURGEMESTRES THE KEY ISSUE IN BOTH ESTABLISHING SECURITY AND IN MOVING TOWARD ELECTIONS. THE PRIME

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MINISTER TOLD ME LAST WEEK THAT THE CLEANUP OF THE TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION WAS HIS NUMBER ONE PRIORITY.

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MRND NATIONAL COMMITTEE MEETS  
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9. ON NOVEMBER 4 THE MRND ASSEMBLED 40 OF THE 50 MEMBERS OF ITS NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT ABOUT ARUSHA. ACCORDING TO FORMER PRIME

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MINISTER NSANZIMANA AND CABINET DIRECTOR RUHIGIRA, BOTH OF WHOM WERE PRESENT, PARTY HARDLINERS CRITICIZED THE PRESIDENT SEVERELY FOR WHAT THEY SAW AS A POTENTIAL COUP D'ETAT IN THE ARUSHA PROCESS. THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER THE MEETING CRITICIZED BOTH THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE PRIME MINISTER, CALLED FOR EARLY PREPARATION FOR ELECTIONS, BUT REFRAINED FROM REPUDIATING SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF T CONSULAR PROTOCOL. BOTH NSANZIMANA AND RUHIGIRA BELIEVE THAT IN THE END THE MODERATES CARRIED THE D AND THE PARTY WILL SUPPORT THE ARUSHA PROTOCOL THAT HAS BEEN NEGOTIATED. ACCORDING TO NSANZIMANA, THERE ARE THREE ARTICLES IN THE DRAFT PROTOCOL WHICH ARE SPECIAL CONCERN, ARTICLES 14, 21, AND 46.

10. ARTICLE 14. ARTICLE 14 PROVIDES FOR THE INCLUSION OF OTHER POLITICAL FACTIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE RPF AND THE GOVERNMENT. MRND LEADERS TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT TH INSISTED ON HAVING OTHER PARTIES INCLUDED. THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE THE SAME POINT IN HIS MEETING WI OPPOSITION PARTY LEADERS. NSANZIMANA CONCEDED THAT THIS REALLY MEANS CDR, AND POINTED OUT THAT THE CDR REPRESENTS A SUBSTANTIAL BODY OF OPINION IN THE COUNTRY AND THAT IT HAS THE CAPABILITY TO SERIOUSLY DISRUPT ANY GOVERNMENT IN WHICH IT DOES NOT TAKE PART. HE AND RUHIGIRA ARGUED THAT THE CDR SHOULD B INCLUDED IN THE NEXT TRANSITION GOVERNMENT. NSANZIMANA PERSONALLY DESPISES THE CDR AND WILL NOT EVEN TALK WITH OLD FRIENDS WHO HAVE MOVED INTO THAT PARTY. HE WAS UNCOMFORTABLE IN THIS PART OF THE

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CONVERSATION WHICH LED ME TO BELIEVE THAT HE HAD BE  
SENT TO PERSUADE M ON THIS POINT BY THE PRESIDENT  
ONE OF HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES.

11. ARTICLE 21. THE FORMULA OF CONSENSUS BEING  
OVERRULED BY A TWO-THIRDS VOTE IN SOME CASES IS OF  
GREAT CONCERN TO THE MRND. THIS CONCERN IS RELATED  
TO THE ONE ABOUT PARTICIPATION OF OTHER PARTIES;  
CLEARLY THE MRND WILL NOT WILLINGLY ACCEPT A FORMUL  
WHICH LEAVES THEM PERMANENTLY IN A LESS THAN

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P 061502Z NOV 92  
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2193  
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ONE-THIRD MINORITY.

12. ARTICLE 46. THIS ARTICLE CALLS FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF BOURGEMESTRES BUT WITHOUT AGREED CRITERIA FOR CHANGE.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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13. NSANZIMANA GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION THAT THE MRND IS NOT PREPARED TO REJECT THE ACCORD BECAUSE OF THE ARTICLES, BUT ONLY TO ASSURE THAT THE CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE ARTICLES ARE PROPERLY NEGOTIATED.

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THE CDR  
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14. HAVING IDENTIFIED THE CDR AS AN ESSENTIAL ISSUE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE NEXT TRANSITION GOVERNMENT I MET WITH THE CDR THIS WEEK. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH THE CDR ACCEPTS MUCH OF THE ARUSHA PROTOCOL. IT AL ACCEPTS THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES. ACCEPTS THE REPARTITION OF POWER BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE CABINET. WHAT IT DOESN'T ACCEPT BEING EXCLUDED FROM THE PROCESS. AND BY LETTERS, STATEMENTS AND COMMUNIQUES THE CDR HAS THREATENED TO DISRUPT THE ENTIRE THE LIFE OF THE COUNTRY IF IT DO NOT GET ITS WAY.

15. I CHALLENGED CDR COUNSELOR JEAN BOSCO BARIYAGWI ON THESE STATEMENTS, TOLD HIM FLATLY THAT THIS KIND OF THREATENING IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE IN A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. HE DEFENDED HIMSELF BY NOTING THAT OTHER PARTIES USED THREATS IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, BUT HE DID NOT BACK DOWN FROM HIS THREAT TO GO INTO THE STRBETS VIOLENTLY IF THE CDR IS

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EXCLUDED. I TOLD HIM HIS TACTICS WERE THOSE OF A  
FACIST, AND UNLESS THE CDR CLEANED UP ITS ACT, IT

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COULD NEVER BE ACCEPTABLE AS A PART OF A DEMOCRATIC  
GOVERNMENT. HE DID SEEM SHAKEN BY MY PRESENTATION,  
BUT I DOUBT IT WILL MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE.

16. THE PAPAL NUNCIO IS PERHAPS EVEN MORE CONCERNE  
ABOUT THE CDR THAN WE ARE. HE TOLD ME LAST NIGHT  
THAT HE HAD INFORMED PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA ON  
NOVEMBER 2 THAT SOME BELIEVE THE PRESIDENT WILL HAV  
TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THE CDR AND THE CHURCH. THE NONC  
BELIEVES THIS WILL BE A HARD CHOICE FOR HABYARIMANA  
WHO HAS SKILLFULLY USED THE CHURCH TO MAINTAIN HIS  
REGIME FOR YEARS.

17. COMMENT. THERE IS A REASONABLE CONSENSUS AMON  
WESTERN AMBASSADORS THAT FOR THE MOMENT OUR ROLE IS  
ESSENTIALLY ONE OF ENCOURAGING DIALOGUE AMONG THE  
INTERNAL PARTIES. THE TANZANIAN AMBASSADOR CAME BY  
TODAY TO SUGGEST A SOMEWHAT MORE ACTIVE ROLE.  
HOWEVER, SHE DOES NOT HAVE ANY SPECIFIC IDEAS OF  
THINGS THAT CONCERNED FOREIGNERS MIGHT PRESS HERE.  
NEVERTHELESS WE TALKED ABOUT A NUMBER OF IDEAS WHIC  
I HAVE KICKED AROUND WITH THE FRENCH, BELGIANS AND  
THE NONCE IN THE LAST FEW DAYS WHICH MIGHT EVENTUAL  
BECOME PROPOSALS WHICH WE WOULD WANT TO PUSH.

18. ON THE KEY ISSUE OF THE FORMATION OF THE  
GOVERNMENT, IT SEEMS TO ME THE CRITICAL POINT  
CONTINUES TO BE WHETHER OR NOT THE CDR IS INCLUDED.  
THIS IS A "FALL ON THE SWORD" KIND OF ISSUE. ONE W  
AROUND IT WOULD BE TO HAVE THE ELEVEN POLITICAL  
PARTIES WHICH ARE NOT A PART OF THE GOVERNMENT MEET

[REDACTED]

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TOGETHER TO SELECT ONE OR TWO CANDIDATES TO JOIN TH  
GOVERNMENT FROM THEIR RANKS. IDEALLY THEY WOULD  
CHOOSE A CANDIDATE OR CANDIDATES OTHER THAN CDR BUT  
PEOPLE CAPABLE OF REPRESENTING THE CDR AND THE OTHE



TEN PARTIES. CONCEIVABLY THEY MIGHT SELECT A CDR REPRESENTATIVE FOR THEIR GROUP WHICH WOULD THEN BE REJECTED BY BOTH THE OPPOSITION PARTIES IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RPF. THIS REJECTION COULD LEAD ANOTHER ELECTION WITHIN THE ELEVEN PARTIES TO PUT FORWARD AN ACCEPTABLE CANDIDATE. CLEARLY WHAT WE A STRUGGLING FOR IS A MECHANISM FOR BREAKING THIS

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LOGJAM. I HAVE SUGGESTED TO THE POLITICAL COUNSELO

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TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE MIGHT START TALKING WITH THE ELEVEN PARTIES ALONG THIS LINE RATHER THAN LEAVING THE ELEVEN TO T MANIPULATION OF THE MRND.

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19. THE OTHER KEY ISSUE IS THE BOURGEMESTRE ISSUE, WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE PARTIES ARE WILLI TO AGREE TO ELECTIONS. AND, OF COURSE, IT IS ELECTIONS WHICH WILL ULTIMATELY DETERMINE THE END O THE TRANSITION PERIOD. THE MRND FEARS THAT A LONG TRANSITION WILL BE SELF-PERPETUATING AS HAS HAPPENE SO OFTEN IN OTHER COUNTRIES, FOR EXAMPLE, IN UGANDA THUS THEY ARE WILLING TO MAKE NO COMPROMISES UNTIL THEY HAVE AN AGREED ELECTORAL PROGRAM. BUT THE OPPOSITION PARTIES WILL NOT ACCEPT ELECTIONS UNTIL THEY HAVE CHANGED THE TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATORS, ESPECIALLY THE BOURGEMESTRES.

20. GRIDLOCK. SO WE ARE EXPLORING SOME POSSIBLE PROCEDURES FOR HAVING A SPECIAL ELECTION FOR BOURGEMESTRES DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD SO THAT FUTURE ELECTION FOR NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND PRESIDENT COULD BE ADMINISTERED IN A WAY ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. THIS IDEA WOULD REQUIRE THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT AND CND TO PASS A SPECIAL ELECTORAL LAW FOR THE ELECTIO OF BOURGEMESTRES DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. IT WOULD THEN PERMIT THE NEW ENLARGED GOVERNMENT TO MA THE FINAL DETERMINATION ON THE ELECTORAL PROCESS FO THE END OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD. A SPECIAL ELECTI FOR BOURGEMESTRES COULD BE DONE WITH A SMALLER NUMB OF FULLY TRAINED PERSONS AND OBSERVERS AND FOREIGN OBSERVERS, PERHAPS SEQUENTIALLY PREFECTURE BY PREFECTURE OR EVEN A FEW COMMUNES AT A TIME, OVER A PERIOD OF WEEKS. THIS IS THE WAY THE FIRST ELECTIO IN RWANDA WERE CONDUCTED IN 1959-1960. THE PROCEDU HAS PRECEDENTS, AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF

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[REDACTED]

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CREATING A MINI ELECTION FOR BOURGEMESTRES TO BREAK

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THE IMPASSE.

21. ALTHOUGH THESE IDEAS ARE FLOATING AROUND TOWN,  
BELIEVE IT IS STILL TOO EARLY FOR US TO SELECT A  
PREFERRED PLAN. I WILL REMAIN IN TOUCH WITH THE  
OTHER AMBASSADORS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY THAT A  
CONCERTED EFFORT BY FOREIGN DIPLOMATS MIGHT AT SOME  
TIME BE APPROPRIATE IN BREAKING THESE DIFFICULT  
IMPASSES. END COMMENT. FLATEN

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\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* n/a  
\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\*