

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AFRICAN AFFAIRS

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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PROVA

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ACTION EUR-00

PARIS 17009 00 OF 04 220916Z 6293 022992 AF3245
PRESS REPORTS INDICATE, ACCORDING TO THE QUAI. THE GOF IS PREPARED TO MEET WITH RPF REPRESENTATIVES IN RWANDA TO GIVE THE RPF A "PHOTO OP," IF THAT WILL HELP WIN AGREEMENT TO A FRENCH PRESENCE. BIHOZAGARA, BRUSSELS-BASED RPF REPRESENTATIVE, WILL COME TO PARIS FOR A MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER JUPPE ON JUNE 22. END SUMMARY.

INFO AFP-01 AS-01 XYA-01 XV-01 EXED-01 NI-01 GH-01 DED-01
SO-01 TZ-01 KE-01 AFRA-01 PMA-01 ZF-01 IV-01 RW-01
SCS-01 ET-01 UG-01 /019 A3 RS

INFO LOG-00 COR-01 AF-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 OASY-00
DODE-00 DOEE-00 EAP-00 EB-00 OIGO-01 H-01 INM-02
TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-16 JUSE-00 L-00 ADS-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01
SB-00 SCT-03 SNP-00 SP-00 SR-00 SSO-00
STR-01 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 SNIS-00 NISG-02
PMB-00 PRM-10 PRNE-01 DRL-09 G-01

5. ON THE EVE OF THE UNSC DISCUSSION OF A RESOLUTION, THE GOF AFRICAN AFFAIRS CIRCUIT IN PARIS HAS BEEN OVERWHELMED WITH PLANNING MEETINGS AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO WIN SUPPORT IN EUROPE AND AFRICA FOR ITS PROPOSAL. THUS, MOST OF OUR CONTACTS HAVE NOT BEEN AVAILABLE FOR DETAILED DISCUSSIONS AND EACH PERSON HAS A PIECE OF A VERY RAPIDLY CHANGING PICTURE.

O 211715Z JUN 94

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6567
INFO FRANCOPHONE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ACCRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
USCINCEUR INTEL VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
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Date: *1/1/94*

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THE UNSC VOTE

6. DEMARCHES IN NEW YORK AND IN UNSC CAPITALS HAVE LEFT THE GOF CONFIDENT THAT THE UNSC RESOLUTION WILL PASS WITH LITTLE CRITICISM. THE QUAI STATED THAT THE UK IS PREPARED TO BE UNDERSTANDING AS WILL CHINA, AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE G-77 CAUCUS. THE SOLE QUESTION MARK IS NIGERIA.

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS 17009

CORRECTED COPY (ADDING ADDEE USCINCEUR)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PHUM, PREF, RW, FR
SUBJECT: QUAI THINKING ON EVE OF UNSC VOTE ON RWANDA

REF: AISTON-PERLOW E-MAIL, 6/21

- 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE; SEE PARAGRAPH 11.

SUMMARY

3. FRENCH PLANNING FOR THE HUMANITARIAN OPERATION IN RWANDA HAS BEGUN TO TAKE A MORE DEFINITE FORM BUT MANY DETAILS ARE DELIBERATELY UNDECIDED TO ALLOW FIELD COMMANDERS MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY IN THEIR OPERATIONS. FRENCH FORCES WILL STAGE THROUGH BUKAVU AND GOMA WITH THE LARGEST NUMBER ENTERING RWANDA VIA GSENYI. THE GOF HAS NOT RECEIVED A RESPONSE FROM DAR ES SALAAM ON USE OF TANZANIAN TERRITORY AND, GIVEN THE LOGISTICAL COMPLICATIONS THAT A POSITIVE GOT ANSWER WOULD ENTAIL, GOF PLANNERS ARE NOT PARTICULARLY DISAPPOINTED BY THE ABSENCE OF A REPLY. THE QUAI BELIEVES IT HAS COMMITMENTS FROM ITALY FOR A SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT PLUS HUMANITARIAN RELIEF SUPPORT, AND FROM BELGIUM AND SPAIN FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

4. ALTHOUGH RPF LEADER KAGAME STILL REFUSES TO MEET WITH GOF AMBASSADOR MARLAUD, CONTACTS ARE CONTINUING IN KAMPALA AT A LOWER LEVEL AND ARE "LESS HOSTILE" THAN

OTHER PARTICIPANTS

7. THE QUAI EXPRESSED GRATITUDE (AND SOME SURPRISE) AT U.S. WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE LOGISTICAL/MATERIEL SUPPORT FOR SENEGAL AND GHANA. BOIVINEAU RECOUNTED THAT THERE WAS GREAT APPRECIATION IN THE GOF FOR THE SUPPORT VOICED BY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER TO FOREIGN

MINISTER JUPPE. THE QUAI HAS GIVEN POINTED EMPHASIS IN ITS MEDIA CONTACTS TO THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, APPARENTLY IN AN EFFORT TO UNDERLINE THE SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, DESPITE THE FAILURE OF EUROPEAN STATES TO PROVIDE TROOPS.

8. DESPITE SOME HAZY SIGNALS FROM ROME, THE GOI HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE A SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF PERSONNEL ONCE THE UNSC HAS BLESSED THE OPERATION. THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN WAS POSITIVE ABOUT PARTICIPATION, BOIVINEAU STATED, BUT CLAIMED THAT GIVEN THE SPANISH PRESENCE IN BOSNIA, IT WAS POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SEND MORE FORCES ABROAD ON A PEACEKEEPING MISSION. HOWEVER, MADRID HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. AS ANNOUNCED EARLIER, SENEGAL (INCLUDING A SMALL UNIT FROM GUINEA-BISSAU) WILL SEND FORCES AS WILL GHANA. EARLIER INDICATIONS OF TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER FRANCOPHONE STATES HAVE NOT MATERIALIZED.

THE SOMALIA OPTION

9. UNSYG BOUTROS SHALL APPARENTLY HAS TEMPERED HIS INITIAL ENTHUSIASM ABOUT A TEMPORARY TRANSFER OF UNSOGN FORCES FROM SOMALIA TO RWANDA, ACCORDING TO BOIVINEAU. THE UNSYG'S DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR MERHEE NOW LEADS THE GOF TO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE "SEVERAL MONTHS" BEFORE SUCH A TRANSFER COULD TAKE PLACE. WAS UNAWARE OF WHAT MIGHT HAVE PROMPTED THE

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CONTACTS WITH THE RPF

10. GOF AMBASSADOR MARLAUD REMAINS IN KAMPALA. ALTHOUGH HE HAS SEEN SOME LOWER RANKING RPF FIGURES, PAUL KAGAME STILL REFUSES TO MEET WITH HIM. BOIVINEAU DESCRIBED RECENT CONTACTS AS "LESS HOSTILE" THAN PORTRAYED IN THE FRENCH PRESS, BUT MARLAUD STILL HAS NOT MANAGED TO CONVINCE THE RPF THAT FRANCE'S INTENTION IS PURELY HUMANITARIAN, AND THAT NO EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO PROTECT THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, TO ENTER INTO KIGALI (WHICH IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF UNAMIR, BOIVINEAU UNDERLINED), OR TO ACT AS AN INTERPOSITION FORCE.

11. THE GOF IS PREPARED TO MEET WITH KAGAME, OR OTHER RPF FIGURE(S), IN RPF-CONTROLLED TERRITORY IN RWANDA, WITH AN ATTENDANT "PHOTO OP", IF SUCH A STEP WOULD ALLOW THE FRONT TO SHOW THAT IT HAS NEGOTIATED WITH

FRANCE ON AN EQUAL FOOTING AND THUS REACH A MODUS VIVENDI WITH PARIS.

ACTION REQUEST: BASED ON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE FRENCH EMBASSY AND AF/C ON JUNE 20, THE QUAI UNDERSTANDS THAT A/S MOOSE WILL SPEAK WITH KAGAME. BOIVINEAU ASKED THAT MOOSE USE HIS GOOD OFFICES WITH THE RPF LEADER TO UNDERLINE FRANCE'S INTENTION OF AVOIDING CONFLICT WITH THE RPF AND LIMITING ITS ACTIONS TO PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS AND TO ASK THAT THE RPF AVOID CLASHES WITH FRENCH SOLDIERS.

REQUEST.

PLEASE ADVISE. END ACTION

12. JACQUES BIHOZAGARA, RPF REPRESENTATIVE FOR EUROPE BASED IN BRUSSELS, IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN PARIS TODAY.

END COMMENT.)

OPERATIONS ON THE GROUND

13. THE GOF PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS IN RWANDA IS DELIBERATELY BEING LEFT VERY FLEXIBLE, ACCORDING TO BOIVINEAU, WITH A GREAT DEAL OF LATITUDE GIVEN TO MILITARY COMMANDERS IN RESPONSE TO CONDITIONS THEY ENCOUNTER ON THE SPOT. FRENCH FORCES WILL STAGE THROUGH BUKAVU AND GOMA, WITH THE LARGEST NUMBER ENTERING RWANDA VIA GESENYI. THE GOF INTENTION IS TO ENTER ONLY/ONLY ON GOR-HELD TERRITORY IN ORDER TO AVOID CLASHES WITH THE RPF AND TO SHOW THAT IT IS THERE TO

PROTECT TUTSIS AND HUTU MODERATES FROM THE FAR AND MILITIAS. MARLAUD WILL MAKE CLEAR TO FAR MILITARY COMMANDERS AND INTERIM GOVERNMENT LEADERS "THAT THE LOGIC OF THE FRENCH OPERATION WILL LEAD TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH THE ARMY AND THE HUTU MILITIAS" IF EFFORTS ARE MADE TO IMPEDE HUMANITARIAN ACTIONS OR TO CARRY OUT MASSACRES IN AREAS WHERE FRENCH FORCES ARE PRESENT.

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BOIVINEAU STATED THAT SHOULD COMBAT CONTINUE IN KIGALI OR ELSEWHERE OUTSIDE THE AREA OF GOF INTERVENTION, THAT WILL NOT BE OF DIRECT CONCERN TO FRENCH FORCES.

15 THE BASE OF FRENCH OPERATIONS WILL REMAIN IN ZAIRE. BASED ON INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM NGO'S, REPORTERS AND UNAMIR, THE GOF BELIEVES IT HAS REASONABLE INFORMATION ON POCKETS OF THREATENED CIVILIANS. IF THE NUMBER OF PERSONS AT A PARTICULAR LOCATION ARE NOT TOO LARGE, THEY WILL BE TRANSPORTED BACK TO CAMPS IN ZAIRE. BOIVINEAU STATED THAT INITIAL PLANNING DOES NOT CALL FOR CAMPS TO BE ESTABLISHED IN RWANDA EXCEPT AS A SHORT-TERM HOLDING MEASURE UNLESS/UNTIL IT IS CLEAR THAT SUCH CAMPS COULD BE FULLY

PROTECTED. SHOULD THE FRENCH FIND A NUMBER OF PERSONS TOO LARGE TO TRANSPORT SAFELY AND QUICKLY, THEY WILL BE PROTECTED WHERE THEY ARE FOUND. ONCE AREAS ARE CONSIDERED "SECURE", THE SCOPE OF OPERATIONS WILL GRADUALLY BE EXPANDED. THE FRENCH DO NOT INTEND TO DISARM MILITIAS OR FAR FORCES, UNLESS THEY ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE WITH FRENCH FORCES OR ARE FOUND COMMITTING ATTACKS.

HARRIMAN

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