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Date: *11/7/94 RWANDA*

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MEMORANDUM

June 17, 1994

TO: Ambassador Albright
THRU: Ambassador Gnehm
FROM: POL - Robert T. Gre *fe*
SUBJECT: Security Council informals, Friday, June 17, 11:00
 am, Other Matters: RWANDA

SUMMARY

The French may brief the Council under "Other Matters" on their planned initiative for Rwanda. If they do, we thought it would be helpful for you to know Washington's position on this issue. Keep in mind, however, that the phone call from Christopher to FM Juppe has not yet taken place, and the points are embargoed until the French have been officially informed of our support. "Forward-leaning" press guidance is being prepared in the Department, saying that we share the French view that the top priority is to stop the killing, and that the French idea is basically a good one, which we will discuss with them.

Drafted: POL:LLShestack, x44360, 06/17/94, wang #20302
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POINTS ON RWANDA FOR THE SECRETARY FOR TELCON WITH FM JUPPE
Friday, June 17, 1994

- We agree that there is an immediate need to stop the killings in Rwanda and that this must be our first priority.
- For this reason, we support your proposed plan for a multinational French-led force to intervene now and "bridge" the gap until the regular UNAMIR contingents can arrive.
- In order to assure the success of the mission and the full support of the international community, we recommend you address the following issues:
 - The mission should have the sanction of the UN and should be fully coordinated with UNAMIR. We would prefer a Security Council resolution authorizing the mission.
 - We agree that other countries should contribute troops to this initiative, and we urge you to have as broad a participation as possible. We are encouraged to hear that the Senegalese and perhaps others have agreed to join.
 - You should continue to talk to the RPF to make clear your purely humanitarian purpose and try to obtain their approval for the mission. The RPF's immediate rejection of the proposal and its threats to engage French troops are of great concern and must be addressed. We are prepared to help on this.
 - You should make similar efforts to enlist the support of Rwanda's neighbors, particularly Uganda. Again, we are prepared to help.
 - Since Zaire is perceived as supporting the interim government, you should avoid an intervention that deploys only from Zaire.
 - You need to address the perception that your actions will lend legitimacy to the interim government. Therefore, you should continue to make clear that this initiative is not intended in any way to intervene in the fighting between government forces and the RPF or to support the government or its forces.
 - In the meantime, we need to accelerate efforts to deploy an expanded UNAMIR. We are working hard to help expedite deployment. We have completed the lease with the UN for 50 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC's) and hope to start delivery next week.
 - We are looking at equipment needs, particularly for the Ghanaian battalion, which we are trying to get on the ground as soon as possible. We will do our best to help equip them and hope you can do the same with other contingents.
 - The U.S. has no intention of sending troops into Rwanda.