

UNCLASSIFIED

CHANNEL: n/a

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EXCISE

INFO	LOG-00	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	EUR-01	HA-09
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00
	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	RPE-00	/024W	

-----91C091 191427Z /38

O 191349Z JAN 93
 FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2739
 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
 AMEMBASSY BONN
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
 AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
 AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
 AMEMBASSY PARIS

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
 () Release (X) Excise () Deny () Declassify
 Date 9/18/98 Exemption B1

SECTION 01 OF 05 KIGALI 00151

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, RW
 SUBJECT: ARUSHA PROTOCOL: FURTHER REACTIONS

REF: KIGALI 00100 ✓

1. [REDACTED]

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 2. SUMMARY: THE PRESIDENT AND HIS PARTY ARE ANGRY AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR THE FAIT ACCOMPLI HE PRESENTED THEM FROM ARUSHA. BUT SOME IN THE MRND SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO ACCEPTING THE PROTOCOL, JOINING THE NEXT GOVERNMENT, AND PERHAPS SEEKING TO IMPROVE THE TERMS DURING THE COURSE OF THE FINAL NEGOTIATIONS. MDR, PL AND PSD LEADERS AGREE THAT A POLICY OF RECONCILIATION IMPLIES MRND INCLUSION IN THE GOVERNMENT, BUT HAVE NOT SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO OFFER MUCH INCENTIVE TO THE HUMILIATED FORMER SINGLE

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PARTY. AREAS OPEN FOR INTERPARTY NEGOTIATION INCLUDE RESHUFFLING PORTFOLIOS AMONG THE FIVE INTERNAL PARTIES TO GIVE THE MRND BETTER MINISTRIES, COMPROMISING ON THE TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION AND OTHER PARTS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT IS FORMED, AGREEING ON FORMULAS FOR REACHING CONSENSUS, INCLUDING AN INNER CABINET, REPLACING THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND/OR THE PRIME MINISTER, AND NEGOTIATING A RATIFICATION PROCESS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. WHETHER ANY OF THESE IDEAS WILL MATURE SUFFICIENTLY TO PREVENT POLITICAL VIOLENCE, AND/OR ENABLE THE GOVERNMENT TO RETURN TO ARUSHA BY JANUARY 25 REMAIN OPEN QUESTIONS. PAST EXPERIENCE WOULD SUGGEST SOME MORE VIOLENCE AND A DELAY IN RETURNING TO ARUSHA. END SUMMARY.

3. BECAUSE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS FAILURE THROUGHOUT THE WEEK, WE ARE COMBINING IN THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIES OF CONVERSATIONS WITH A WIDE SPECTRUM OF RWANDANS FROM THE EVENING OF JANUARY 11 THROUGH EARLY MORNING JANUARY 15. THESE CONVERSATIONS INCLUDE A MEETING

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WITH PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA ON JANUARY 13, THE PRIME MINISTER JANUARY 14, THE FOREIGN MINISTER JANUARY 13 AND 14, THE DEFENSE MINISTER JANUARY 12 AND 14, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY JANUARY 14, THE MINISTER OF HIGHER EDUCATION JANUARY 13, THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS JANUARY 14, FORMER PRIME MINISTER NSANZIMANA JANUARY 14, PRESIDENTS OF THE PL AND MDR JANUARY 12 AND 14, AND CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTOR OF THE CABINET EACH OF THE FIVE DAYS.

PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA

4. FOLLOWING OUR DEMARCHE ON THE WHO (SEPTTEL), THE FRENCH AND BELGIAN AMBASSADORS AND I WERE ASKED BY THE PRESIDENT FOR OUR OPINION ON THE ARUSHA PROTOCOL. WE SAID IT WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE TO HEAR HIS IMPRESSIONS. HIS RESPONSE WAS "WHO CARES?" HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE OTHER PARTIES AND THE OBSERVERS HAD TREATED HIM AS THOUGH NOBODY CARED WHAT HIS VIEWS WERE. HE SAID THAT HE HAS BEEN

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DELIBERATELY MARGINALIZED AND WONDERED ALOUD HOW A GOVERNMENT COULD FUNCTION WHEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER REFUSES TO OBEY A DIRECT ORDER NOT TO SIGN AN ACCORD.

5. WHAT FOLLOWED WAS AN HOUR AND A HALF OF DISCUSSIONS IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT REVEALED HIS ANGER AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE PRIME MINISTER, HIS FRUSTRATION BY THE FAILURE OF THE PROCESS, BUT HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO BREAK ANY CROCKERY AT THIS STAGE.

[REDACTED]

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6. ALTHOUGH WE HAD NOT PREPARED A DEMARCHE TO THE PRESIDENT, EACH OF US OFFERED SOME ENCOURAGEMENT TO HIM TO TRY TO FIND WAYS TO WORK WITH THE PROTOCOL, AND TO KEEP THE MRND IN THE GAME.

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	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00

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SS-00 TRSE-00 T-01 USIE-00 RPE-00 /024W
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O 191349Z JAN 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2740
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY PARIS

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, RW
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] I ALSO ENCOURAGED THE PRESIDENT TO

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KEEP THE MRND IN THE GOVERNMENT, NOTING THAT THE
RECENT PROTOCOL IS ONLY THE THIRD STEP IN A FIVE STEP
PROCESS, AND THAT IT SEEMED TO US THERE WERE MEANS OF
KEEPING THE MRND IN THE GOVERNMENT THAT OUGHT BE
TESTED, FOR EXAMPLE, TO REESTABLISH THE PRINCIPLE OF
CONSENSUS, BUILDING ON THE EXCLUSIONS IN ARTICLE 21
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATING AN INNER CABINET. I
ADDED THAT A GOVERNMENT PROGRAM NEGOTIATED IN
ADVANCE, ESPECIALLY CONTAINING AGREEMENT ON
TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, PERHAPS BASED ON THE
DECEMBER 21 MRND PAPER, MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED.
FINALLY, I SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S OWN THEME OF
RECONCILIATION FOR 1993 COULD NOT BE FULFILLED IF THE
MRND REMAINED OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT.

7. RWANDOPHILES WILL BE INTERESTED IN SOME OF THE
MORE STRIDENT COMMENTS OF PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA
DURING THIS CONVERSATION:

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-- ARUSHA NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOT REAL NEGOTIATIONS. THEY WERE BETWEEN THE OPPOSITION PARTIES AND THE RPF WHO ARE FRIENDS NOT ENEMIES. HOW CAN OTHER PARTIES ACCEPT THAT NGULINZIRA, THE PERSON, PASSES POWER TO THE OPPOSITION AND THE RPF. HOW CAN WE ACCEPT THAT THE RPF COMES INTO THE COUNTRY AND DIVIDES UP THE COUNTRY, AFTER ALL OF THE HISTORY OF ETHNIC RIVALRIES AND DIFFERENCES IN THE PAST.

-- THE MRND CANNOT HAVE A ROLE IN THIS GOVERNMENT WHEN ALREADY THE COALITION OF THE PL AND THE RPF HAS A PERMANENT BLOCKING ONE-THIRD. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE

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FORMULA THAT NO PARTY SHOULD HAVE EITHER A PERMANENT TWO-THIRDS OR A PERMANENT BLOCKING ONE-THIRD?

-- THERE ARE ONLY TWO SOLUTIONS. EITHER SUPPRESS ARTICLE 21 (THE TWO-THIRDS VOTE), OR FORCE THE RPF TO ACCEPT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS (INCLUDING THE CDR IN THE CABINET).

-- THE PERMANENT ALLIANCE OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES WILL LAST ONLY AS LONG AS NECESSARY TO OVERTHROW THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC. THE PRESIDENT IS NOT AGAINST THE PRESIDENT LEAVING, BUT THERE MUST BE A PROCESS FOR REMOVING HIM FROM OFFICE.

-- WITH THE PRESENT CONFIGURATION OF THE PROTOCOL, THE OPPOSITION PARTIES AND THE RPF WILL CHANGE EVERYTHING. EVERY BOURGEMESTRE, EVERY CIVIL SERVANT AND EVERYTHING THAT HAS WORKED IN THIS COUNTRY. THIS IS THE FAULT OF THE OBSERVERS.

-- WHY DON'T THE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS ORGANIZE ELECTIONS IN OUR COUNTRY SO WE CAN KNOW WHO HAS HOW MUCH POWER.

-- THIS COUNTRY CANNOT BE GOVERNED WHEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER DISOBEYS THE PRESIDENT.

-- IN ANY EVENT, THERE MUST BE A CND VOTE OR A REFERENDUM TO LEGITIMATE THE FINAL ACCORD, IF AND WHEN REACHED.

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8. WE LEFT THE PRESIDENT IN SOMEWHAT BETTER SPIRITS
THA WHEN WE ARRIVED, BUT HE MADE NO COMMITMENT TO
TRY TO KEEP HIS PARTY FROM TOTALLY REJECTING THE
JANUARY 9 PROTOCOL. OUR ONLY ENCOURAGEMENT WAS THAT
HE SOUGHT OUR VIEWS AND HAS NOT TAKEN ANY PRECIPITATE
OR IRREVERSIBLE ACTION. WE CHOSE NOT TO TALK WITH
THE PRESS AFTER THE MEETING, NOR DID THE PRESIDENCY
MAKE A STATEMENT. UNFORTUNATELY, OUR DIPLOMATIC
SILENCE HAS BEEN INTERPRETED BY MRND HARDLINERS AS
EVIDENCE THAT WE PUT PRESSURE ON THE PRESIDENT TO
ACCEPT THE PROTOCOL, AND HE YIELDED. THIS GROUP HAS
THREATENED TO WITHDRAW ITS SUPPORT FROM THE

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INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 EUR-01 HA-09
H-01 INRE-00 INR-01
L-03 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00
SS-00 TRSE-00 T-01 USIE-00 RPE-00 /024W
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O 191349Z JAN 93
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AMEMBASSY BONN

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3.

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY PARIS

SECTION 03 OF 05 KIGALI 00151

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, RW
SUBJECT: ARUSHA PROTOCOL: FURTHER REACTIONS

PRESIDENT, ACCORDING TO ENOCH RUHIGIRA, BUT IT'S NOT
CLEAR WHAT THEY THINK THEIR OPTIONS ARE.

OTHER MRND VIEWS

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9. IN THE COURSE OF A LONG CONVERSATION AT HIS
INITIATIVE, DEFENSE MINISTER GASANA IDENTIFIED
HIMSELF TO ME AS A MODERATE VOICE IN THE MRND. HE
WOULD PREFER TO SEE THE MRND ENTER THE GOVERNMENT,
PERHAPS ON A PROVISIONAL BASIS, FEELING THEMSELVES
FREE TO LEAVE IF THEIR VIEWS ARE NOT RESPECTED. HE
HAS A HARD TIME SEEING HOW THE MRND CAN RELINQUISH
THE DEFENSE MINISTRY TO SO CALLED OPPOSITION
PARTIES. IN THIS HE IS SUPPORTED FIRMLY BY THE ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF. BOTH HAVE TAKEN SOME HEAT,
ESPECIALLY THE DEFENSE MINISTER, FOR TRYING TO
PROTECT THE ARMY FROM THE POLITICIZATION WHICH HAS
TAKEN PLACE IN OTHER MINISTRIES. BUT BOTH FEAR THE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE MINISTRY GOING TO ANOTHER PARTY.
(COMMENT: IN THE END THIS MAY BE THE STRONGEST

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ARGUMENT FOR THE MRND AND THE PRESIDENT TO REMAIN
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WITHIN THE NEXT TRANSITION GOVERNMENT.)

10. GASANA ALSO POSED THE QUESTION OF HOW COULD THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA REJECT THE PROTOCOL. HE SAID HIS INFORMATION IS THAT THE RPF ALREADY FEELS THAT IT HAS CONCEDED TOO MUCH TO THE GOVERNMENT. THUS A REJECTION OF THIS PROTOCOL BY THE GOVERNMENT WOULD ALMOST AUTOMATICALLY LEAD TO A RETURN TO WAR. GASANA ALSO WORRIED THAT THE RPF MIGHT USE THE MRND REJECTION OF THE PROTOCOL, BY STAYING OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT, AS AN EXCUSE TO RENEW ITS ATTACK.

11. GASANA SEEMED PERFECTLY WILLING TO DISCUSS FURTHER WITH THE OTHER PARTIES THE PROGRAM OF THE GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY A COMPROMISE ON THE CLEANUP OF THE TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INNER CABINET, AND THE DISCUSSION OF THE EXCLUSIONS FROM THE TWO-THIRDS VOTE IN ARTICLE 21, SUGGESTING THAT EVEN TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION MIGHT BE EXCLUDED FROM VOTES AS A SECURITY QUESTION. FINALLY HE SAID THE DURATION OF THE TRANSITION MUST BE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED, SUGGESTING THAT A SHORT DURATION MIGHT INFLUENCE THE MRND TO JOIN THE GOVERNMENT. THE MRND MINISTER OF HIGHER EDUCATION (FROM THE MRND BASTION OF RUHINGERI) ASKED TO SEE ME URGENTLY TO DISCUSS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME ISSUES. HE SEEMED OPEN TO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE OTHER PARTIES.

12. FORMER PRIME MINISTER NSANZIMANA TOLD ME JANUARY 14 THAT HE HAD URGED PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA TO ACCEPT
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THE PROTOCOL AS IT IS. HE EXPLAINED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT IN DEALING WITH MINORITIES IT WAS THE WISEST POLICY TO GIVE THEM WHAT THEY WANTED TO MAKE THEM FEEL SAFE, AND THEREFORE THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR TO THE RPF WAS PERFECTLY REASONABLE. I DID NOT GET THE IMPRESSION THAT THE PRESIDENT WELCOMED THIS ADVICE.

13. CLEARLY THE MRND IS SPLIT ON TACTICS. DRIVEN BY THE CDR ON THE EXTREME RIGHT TO TOTAL REJECTION OF THE PROTOCOL, IT ALSO HAS CALMER VOICES WHO FEAR THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE PARTY IF IT FAILS TO JOIN THE NEXT TRANSITION GOVERNMENT. AT A MINIMUM MOST FEAR A DESCENT INTO INTERNAL VIOLENCE IF A FRUSTRATED MRND/CDR FEELS EXCLUDED FROM POLITICAL POWER. ONE TACTIC THEY SEEM TO HAVE AGREED ON IS TO SUMMON THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE CND NEXT WEEK WHERE HE MAY BE SUBJECTED TO A MOTION OF CENSURE.

[REDACTED]

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OTHER PARTY VIEWS

14. PL PRESIDENT MUGENZI CALLED ME JANUARY 12 TO SAY THAT THE MDR, PSD AND PL HAD JUST MET, HAD DECIDED TO

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	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00
	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	RPE-00	/024W	

-----91C111 191431Z /38

O 191349Z JAN 93
 FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2742
 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
 AMEMBASSY BONN
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
 AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
 AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
 AMEMBASSY PARIS

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, RW
 SUBJECT: ARUSHA PROTOCOL: FURTHER REACTIONS

SEEK FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE MRND WITH A VIEW TO
 ENCOURAGING IT TO ACCEPT THE PROTOCOL, AND ASKED ME
 TO BE THE MEDIATOR FOR THIS EFFORT. I TOLD HIM THAT
 I WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO HELP BRING THE PARTIES

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 TOGETHER FOR FURTHER CONVERSATIONS, BUT COULD NOT
 TAKE ON A MEDIATING ROLE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM

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WASHINGTON, AND THOUGHT THAT, IN ANY CASE, IT WOULD NOT BE WISE FOR ME TO SIT IN ON THEIR MEETINGS. BY JANUARY 14 HE SEEMED TO HAVE FORGOTTEN THIS REQUEST, WHEN HE AND MDR PRESIDENT TWAGIRAMUNGU CAME BY TO TALK ABOUT THE TERMS OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE MRND.

15. BOTH MUGENZI AND TWAGIRAMUNGU BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF REDUCING THE NEED FOR VOTING IN THE CABINET, AND EXPANDING THE ROLE FOR CONSENSUS IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. BOTH BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN NEGOTIATE AN ARRANGEMENT ON THE CLEANING UP OF THE TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, ALTHOUGH MUGENZI BELIEVES THAT THREE BOURGEMESTRES MUST BE SUSPENDED EVEN THOUGH THE MRND INSISTS THAT THEY ALL BE GIVEN NEW JOBS. OPPOSITION PARTY VIEWS ARE MIXED BUT ESSENTIALLY NEGATIVE ON HOW TO LEGITIMATE AN ACCORD. MOST REJECT THE REFERENDUM. THE FOREIGN MINISTER ALSO REJECTS THE CND, A MAJORITY OF WHOSE MEMBERS ARE ON RECORD OPPOSING THE LATEST PROTOCOL. NEVERTHELESS, THE PARTIES UNDERSTAND THAT SOME FORM OF RATIFICATION OR LEGITIMIZATION WILL BE NEEDED, AND IT IS A SUBJECT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH THE MRND.

16. MUGENZI REPORTED A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY IN WHICH THE KEY ISSUE SEEMED TO BE THE DISTRIBUTION OF PORTFOLIOS, NOT THE NUMBER. HE AND TWAGIRAMUNGU BOTH AGREED THAT THEY COULD NEGOTIATE THE REDISTRIBUTION OF PORTFOLIOS AMONG THE FOUR

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INTERNAL PARTIES TO GIVE THE MRND A SENSE THAT THEY HAD A BETTER SELECTION. THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY COULD REOPEN THE QUESTION OF THE PORTFOLIOS ASSIGNED TO THE RPF, ALTHOUGH BOTH OF THEM FELT THAT NGULINZIRA HAD SOLD OUT ON THIS POINT, GIVING THE RPF EVERYTHING THAT IT HAD ASKED FOR RATHER THAN NEGOTIATING.

17. PICKING UP FROM THIS THEME ON NGULINZIRA, BOTH MUGENZI AND TWAGIRAMUNGU SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD SACK THE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR GOING BEYOND HIS MANDATE. I GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS IS ONE VERY SMALL SACRIFICE THAT THE TWO LEADERS ARE PREPARED TO MAKE TOWARD PACIFYING THE PRESIDENT. I ALSO GOT THE

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IMPRESSION THAT, IF THE PRIME MINISTER WERE TO DECIDE THAT HE HAD TO DEFEND THE FOREIGN MINISTER, THE TWO PARTY LEADERS WOULD BE PERFECTLY HAPPY TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER SACKED ALSO. IN FACT, MUGENZI HAS SUGGESTED TO ME THAT IT IS HIS OBJECTIVE TO REPLACE DISMAS NSENYAREMGWE WITH HIS GOOD FRIEND FAUSTIN TWAGIRAMUNGFU. TWAGIRAMUNGU HAS NOT MENTIONED THAT POSSIBILITY TO ME.

18. THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER OVER DINNER AT THE RESIDENCE JANUARY 14, SEEMED WELL AWARE OF THE RISKS THEY HAVE TAKEN, NOTED THAT HISTORICALLY PEACEMAKERS HAVE NOT BEEN POPULAR, E.G., MENDES-FRANCE, AND EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO RETURN TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR. BUT THEY SEEMED UNWILLING TO ACCEPT MY SUGGESTION THAT AT THIS STAGE IT IS THEIR RESPONSIBILITY TO REACH OUT TO INCLUDE THE PRESIDENT

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 KIGALI 00151 04 OF 05 191431Z AND THE MRND, SINCE THEY ARE NOW IN CONTROL AND RECONCILIATION DEMANDS INCLUSION RATHER THAN EXCLUSION (WORDS THEY BOTH USED WITH HANK COHEN TWO WEEKS AGO).

19. PSD LEADER GATABAZI OFFERED A SOMEWHAT MORE LONG RANGE VIEW OF THE PROBLEM. HE SAID THE PARTIES MUST WORK WITH THE MRND, IF IT ACCEPTS THE PROTOCOL. THE PSD WILL ACCEPT THE INNER CABINET, EVEN THOUGH THE RPF REJECTS THE IDEA, AND WILL COMPROMISE WITH THE MRND ON THE TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION QUESTION. HE

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	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00
	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	RPE-00	/024W	

-----91C12C 191433Z /38

O 191349Z JAN 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2743
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
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AMEMBASSY PARIS

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, RW
SUBJECT: ARUSH
A PROTOCOL: FURTHER REACTIONS

SAID "WE HAVE PLAYED THE GAME THIS FAR TO WEAKEN
HABYARIMANA, BUT WE DON'T KNOW WHERE IT WILL END, AND
WE DON'T KNOW WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE RPF." HE SAID
THE PARTIES HAD SUGGESTED KANYARENGWE AS MINISTER OF

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INTERIOR BECAUSE HE KNOWS THE COUNTRY, BUT GATABAZI
HIMSELF WOULD PREFER TO HAVE A TUTSI FROM THE RPF
BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A KANYARENGWE-CDR
CONNECTION WHICH WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTERESTS OF ANY
OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES.

COMMENT

20. MUGENZI AND TWAGIRAMUNGU ARE DEEP INTO

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CONVERSATIONS WITH THE MRND LEADERSHIP. THE AGENDA IS FAIRLY CLEAR AND ESSENTIALLY AGREED ON BY BOTH SIDES. WHETHER THEY CAN PERSUADE THE PRESIDENT AND THE MRND HARDLINERS THAT THEY WILL HAVE A REAL ROLE IN A FUTURE GOVERNMENT, IS THE KEY UNCERTAINTY. THE SECOND ISSUE, AS ALWAYS, IS WHETHER ANYTHING IS AGREEABLE WITHOUT SOME FORMAL ROLE FOR THE CDR.

21. MY PRIMARY CONCERN IS THAT BOTH TWAGIRAMUNGU AND MUGENZI SEEM A LITTLE TOO SMUG ABOUT THE PROTOCOL AND A LITTLE LESS THAN GRACIOUS IN OFFERING CONCESSIONS TO THE DIMINISHED MRND. TO DATE, THEY AND THEIR COLLEAGUES, INCLUDING THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER, HAVE KEPT UPPING THE ANTE WITH EACH SUCCESS AGAINST THE MRND. AT THIS POINT IT WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE FOR THEM TO BE A LITTLE MORE GENEROUS. I HAVE SAID AS MUCH TO ALL OF THEM, BUT AM NOT SURE WE'RE BEING HEARD.

22. THE MOST HOPEFUL SIGN IS THAT MINDS SEEM TO BE OPEN STILL, THAT NO DOORS HAVE BEEN FIRMLY SHUT, AND

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[REDACTED]

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THAT NONE OF THE PARTIES HAS, SO FAR, RESORTED TO VIOLENCE. THE LATTER MAY CHANGE QUICKLY, AS MRND AND CDR MILITANTS ARE THREATENING EVERY NIGHT. BUT AS EACH DAY PASSES, THE SENSE OF IMMINENT CRISIS SEEMS TO DIMINISH. IT IS MY EFFORT TO PERSUADE PEOPLE THAT THEY HAVE A BIT OF TIME TO WORK THIS OUT, SINCE THEY WILL NOT HAVE THIS NEW GOVERNMENT IN PLACE BEFORE THE MONTH OF APRIL AND MORE LIKELY MAY OR JUNE.

23. RWANDANS ARE SKILLED AT BRINKSMANSHIP. THEY WILL PROBABLY MIX SOME POLITICAL VIOLENCE, VARIOUS FORMS OF THREATS WITH SOME SERIOUS DISCUSSION TO ARRIVE AT A TENTATIVE AGREEMENT PERMITTING RETURN TO ARUSHA, BUT THEY MAY BE A LITTLE LATE GETTING THERE. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS STILL A CHANCE THAT INTRANSIGENCE WILL PERSIST AND VIOLENCE DESIGNED TO MAKE A POLITICAL POINT WILL GET OUT OF HAND. FLATEN

[REDACTED]