

Pseudonym:

Witness Code: MELVLIN

MELVLIN-4

P. 16(b)

ICTR-98-41-T
Exh. P. 16(b)
Transmitted on: 11/09/2002.
EW

Melvorn
Linda

"Surete interieure et exterieure du Pays" authored by Col.
Anatole Nsengiyumva

DOCUMENT INFORMATION			
Doc Type:	Letter	For Witness Statement:	
Doc Sources:	Melvorn	Signature Date:	
Doc Location:	ICTR	Interviewer 1:	
Doc Original No.:		Interviewer 2:	
Doc Date:	07-Oct-90	DOCUMENT CODING:	
Format:	Typewritten	Document code:	MELVLIN-4
Original language:	French	ICTR Number:	
Translation:	English	ERN Number:	L001-0359-L001-0364
ERN Translation:	L001 6726-32	Disclosure Code:	MELVLIN-4
		Disclosable:	Yes
Past Disclosure---Past Disclosure---Past Disclosure---Past Disclosure			
IN	Code Used	Date	Support
Bagosora	MELVLIN-4	09-May-02	No
Kabiligi	MELVLIN-4	09-May-02	No
Nsengiyumva	MELVLIN-4	09-May-02	No
Ntabakuze	MELVLIN-4	09-May-02	No

SECRET

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
RWANDAN ARMY
STAFF HEADQUARTERS
G2

Kigali, 7 October 1991

N° 084/G2.2.2.1.4

Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army

Sir,

Subject: Internal and external security of the country.

1. I have the honour to submit below my views on the current situation of our country. By means of personal views and considerations, I will propose some of the attitudes, which I feel, in my opinion, should be adopted in order to face up to this situation.
2. The situation currently prevailing in our country is VERY worrying. Essentially, our country has been invaded by elements commonly known as the INKOTANYI, composed mostly of Tutsi refugees and, on the other hand, by certain Hutus with a craving for money or adventure, who for one reason or another, want at all costs to get the current regime toppled for their personal gains.
3. In my last analysis, reflected in ML N° 083/G2.2.0 of 22 September 1990, I listed requirements for the Inyenzi to attack our country. In conclusion, I affirmed that our country was not prepared to be attacked. I therefore made an error of judgement, for hardly had a week gone by than the Inkotanyi attacked. Did I commit a fundamental error? I will return to that in my views and considerations.
4. Now then, our country has been invaded and the aggressors have taken a part of our country that was occupied. What matters at the moment is to face up to this crisis by ending the insecurity looming in our capital and in our country in general. In the second phase, it is necessary to reconquer the part of our country that has been plundered by the aggressors.
5. How can we attain this dual objective? Here, I will simply go back to the findings of ML supra, namely it is necessary to:
 - (a) Nurture constantly cohesion within the nation.
 - (b) Stay on very good terms with Uganda. The Inyenzi would NOT venture without support from a host country, for their actions would be suicidal and limited.

- (c) Pursue the effort to seek a lasting solution to the refugee problem. This effort should be supported by all officials. It is regrettable that certain people publicly declare their opposition to it, whereas they have got no alternative solution.
- (d) Take security measures to prevent sabotage activities and surprise.
- (e) Prepare the FAR to face up to the attacks, if necessary, since the threat is increasingly becoming apparent and it is NOT certain that a definitive solution will be found before the anger of the refugees explodes, or that such a solution, if found, would satisfy every one.

I then said those were the points, in order of priority, to which more attention should be brought. Perhaps, I may have erred in my order of priorities. But I still feel that these conditions are necessary to rise up to the current threat.

On other occasions, I stated that it was necessary to sign military cooperation agreements as well as defence treaties. I then gave details on how to reach such arrangements. I hold that this argument proves me right.

6. Let's then examine these conditions so as to see whether we are in a position to ward off the evil that has taken root in our country.
 - (a) As regards readiness, our soldiers are ill-prepared. In fact, our men no longer observe firing rules. Many of them panic at the first enemy gunshot, while others take fright and begin to fire left and right and still others do the worst, as they simply desert their units, turn in their berets and go away. These are some of the things, which show that our men are not at all prepared for their mission.
 - (b) There are many reasons for this lack of preparedness. First, there is the economic situation. Owing to a tight budget, our country HAS NOT provided enough funds for the proper training of our men. Often, cartridges for shooting drills are in short supply while real cartridges are unavailable. The Rwandan Army has almost no more grenades. In general, explosives, engineering corps equipment, ...etc, are lacking. So our men never managed to practise.

This is further compounded by the lack of motivation by certain officials, officers, sub-officers as well as sergeants and corporals. In fact, many now join the military simply to make money or lead an easy life, for the State provides everything. The outcome cannot also be satisfactory. Hence, the setbacks should not also surprise anyone.

7. We have always recommended security measures and applied them in the Armed Forces. But this does not happen at the national level.

All these weapons that have entered the country, all these documents that have been falsified, all these facilities that have been given to people of doubtful civic spirit, are all points that have been constantly condemned, even at the level of my office. But their persistence gives the impression that there is some complicity or laxity in short.

In this domain, the measures recommended may have been considered cumbersome and not well applied. Then why should it be surprising that infiltrations were made easy, that clandestine imports of weapons were ignored, ...etc? The outcome is what we are currently experiencing.

8. The effort to find a lasting solution to the refugee problem has covered a lot of ground. However, it is yet to bear fruit.

But then how many officials have supported the decision to set up a joint Rwandan-Ugandan commission to address the refugee problem? Rather, many have instead criticized it. I have kept you frequently abreast of this. The question is whether that was the same thing on the Ugandan side. The vast majority of the refugees have rejected the decision. Even if, officially, the negotiations will continue, it is difficult to say whether they will be completed successfully.

9. We have never had excellent relations with Uganda. However, it could be said that they are VERY GOOD. But can it be said that these relations are still viewed in the same manner? It would be difficult for me to say so when Uganda has descended a horde of 10,000 men on us. How can a country affirm that it is UNABLE to control the situation, up to the point of not knowing that 10,000 armed and uniformed men left its territory?

It will be difficult to convince me that this is possible. As far as I am concerned, the Inkotanyi have the blessing of the Ugandan Government.

10. The authorities have always advocated national cohesion at various levels. But does insistence by these authorities not amount to weakening that very cohesion? Recently, it is common knowledge that relations have deteriorated between the Bakiga and the Banyanduga, between the Banyagisenyi and the Banyaruhengeri, between the Hutus and the Tutsis, indeed, between the poor and the rich. Thus, the cohesion vaunted in slogans, remains rather weak, and this weakness could have unfortunate consequences, particularly, during the period we are now witnessing.
11. All these parameters that I have just elaborated upon, amply show that the security of our country is still very fragile. If a country is in the throes of an external aggression, then hopes may indeed grow slimmer. And I fear that is what we may experience. This leads me to think that our current problem is not due solely to the Inkotanyi aggression.

Rather, I think that there are several interlinked factors. The impetus is certainly preponderant, since it is these famous Inkotanyi that have invaded our country. But is it necessary to prove further that many other people want to use the current situation to their own advantage? For instance, may I remind you of the words of this Officer, who said: "Many of us want change". Problems of ethnicity, regionalism, racketeering, patronage, refugees, the economic crisis...etc, are some of the factors, which continue to worsen the current situation in our country.

12. To end all this and restore peace to the country, the factors reflected in ML supra, remain valid but with a few changes, resulting from new facts on the current situation.

- (a) First, the "war must be won". The invaders have conquered part of our territory. We have NO justification if we DO NOT show the population that we have reconquered the territory. In this respect, military cooperation with friendly countries could help us attain our objective. Assistance arrived in good time. In my opinion, it would have been too late had it arrived later.
- (b) Here, the contribution of the population is very vital. Any initiative bereft of their contribution is doomed to fail. It is therefore necessary to win the sympathy of the population. It demands JUST a little, but it is necessary to think about that. In the current situation, we run the risk of alienating from us the sympathy of the population.
- I would like to underscore a negative factor, which may alienate this sympathy from us. You know that within the context of the fight against the spread of the Inkotanyi, the air-force squad (ESC Avi) at a given time, shot at huge numbers of people streaming to the South of Kiramuruzi. Many died. Do you believe that the Inkotanyi who wanted to slip through would move in great numbers in the day and, in open country? NOT at all. Do you believe that the population would willingly provide cover to the enemies of the country by accompanying them in great numbers and would flock to the hills? I for one do not believe so. Instead, it worries me. Not long from now, some could take advantage of such an allegation to attack the government, which allegedly shot at the innocent population. This is a very delicate matter that should NOT at all be raised; Rather it should be forgotten and NEVER brought up again. In the same connection, certain decisions should not be taken too hastily. Definitely, to an exceptional situation, an exceptional solution; but sometimes, it is necessary to know how to discern. It would really be improper, for instance, to regret that someone was unfairly locked up because things were done too hastily. Those are examples of certain acts or moves that should be avoided so as not to alienate the sympathy of the population from us, particularly, at these difficult times.

13. What can we say about measures prescribed as a result of the current situation? The people have welcomed these measures very favourably. But then they are beginning to grow weary of them. For instance, city dwellers are unable to get fresh supplies. They are therefore wondering when this is going to end. Others say it is really impossible to go to work when taxis are banned from plying the roads. They hope that this ban will soon be lifted. Many (Hutus) would wish that all Tutsis be searched. Still others would wish that government and private offices be searched thoroughly before workers are allowed to resume work. In fact, some assert that firearms are channeled through offices.

14. Personal views and considerations

(a) The current situation in our country is rather worrying. It is dominated particularly by the Inkotanyi invasion of our country. The said invasion should have worried us less, had semi-official sources NOT tended to confirm Uganda's support for the Inkotanyi rebels.

(b) Uganda's attitude to the case bothering us is really strange. Yoweri Museveni, President of Uganda, and current Chairman of the OAU, should not support such a thing.

Rwanda has never wanted to pester Uganda. I don't understand why Uganda wants to pester us. If indeed President Museveni supports the Inkoyanyi, then he has failed to keep his word. But I had also anticipated this scenario when I made my last analyses. Therefore, it would NOT be a surprise to me. That is why, even if it is NOT confirmed, all the same it is important to prepare against these acts "of treason". We cannot face the war-tested NRA, which by far outnumbers us both in man and equipment. It is therefore necessary to foresee other procedures:

- First, work with President Museveni at the bilateral level, or at any other appropriate level.
- Should this fail, it will be necessary to initiate diplomatic action, involving one or several other countries. It is only in this way that the Ugandan President could change his opinion. And it is at that price that the Inkotanyi invasion of our country could be crushed.

(c) If Uganda were not to support the rebels, then we would not worry that much, as long as our friends intervened to halt the Inkotanyi influx.

(d) At any rate, to get good results, it would be necessary for all the departments, the entire population, to answer "present" like one man. Yet, I have the feeling that is not the case. Some authorities do not speak the same language, certain workers are indifferent and do not assume their responsibility. That's how our men (the military) demand their ration when they do not get it whereas it is their right, and their morale is undermined.

- (e) The soldiers don't appear to be very motivated. Demoralizing elements seem to be working very hard to sap their morale.
- (f) Somehow, the consequences of the invasion (curfew, ban on taxi movements, ... etc) are beginning to irritate the population, particularly, city dwellers. The special measures prescribed certainly have merits but the constraints they impose make it are very difficult to apply them.

The said measures should be relaxed, particularly, by authorizing markets to be opened and compelling everyone to attend their local market. Subsequently, people would resume work normally, and taxis would be allowed to convey people to their offices. In fact, it would be absurd to ask anyone to be in the office at 7 am whereas we are aware that it is not possible.

- (g) Exercises for our men, indeed, their training is of vital importance.
- (h) Cohesion amongst all Rwandans is a sine qua non for success. Without such cohesion, ethnic and regional conflicts would resurface in full force, and it would be difficult to contain them. Those who fish in troubled water would certainly use the events to their own advantage. It is therefore necessary to banish these regional tendencies, which would only continue to poison the atmosphere.
- (i) It is also necessary to intensify our relations with neighbouring as well as friendly countries that are likely to come to our aid during these difficult times, for instance, now.

15. CONCLUSION

- (a) The overall situation of our country is NOT at all good. It should be cured along the following points:
 - (i) Train and drill our men, so as to compel them to face the hard life of a combatant without any complex.
 - (ii) Take necessary security measures, particularly, now that the necessity is well known.
 - (iii) Work in a calm atmosphere and avoid ethnic and regional excesses. Unfortunately, I think we are moving towards that direction. Disunity has never helped.
- (b) Our men should be drilled to face the valiant combatants.
- (c) Our relations with friendly countries should be revitalized each day.

- (d) Our country is defending a noble cause. That's why I am confident that events currently shaking it will end. But then everyone must make a positive contribution.

(Signed)

Nsengiyumva Anatole
Lt. Col. BEMS
G2, Rwandan Army Staff Headquarters.

Copied: Deputy Rwandan Army Chief of Staff