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Annex D / 1 of Minutes NO. 882 of 16 / 08 / 95
Criminal Investigation Department

SUMMARY RECORD OF MEETING OF 15 FEB 94

1. **Logistic Support of the Battalion and Detachment (BE)**

Compared to the BANGLADESH and GHANIAN Battalions which have no autonomy in terms of logistics and which expect everything to come from the UN, the policy of Belgium is much more (*illegible*) and enables the Battalion to become rapidly operational which is a valuable moral factor in terms of the framework and (*illegible*). It should be realized that if KIBAT had not arrived with its equipment and material, the KIGALI Secteur would not have been able to accomplish the "CLEAN CORRIDOR" mission. (*Next sentence illegible.*)

Given what has been experienced since the beginning of December, the policy undertaken by the EMG (*Sic*) in that regard, is the most appropriate.

The EMG should also listen carefully to certain requests made by the QG (Headquarters) where Belgians work. Within UNAMIR we are all Belgians and replies such as "UN Structure, we have nothing to give, please contact the competent personnel" are unacceptable.

2. **Psychological Preparation**

Special effort should be made in this field and given all the incidents involving the 1st Detachment, the second one should not commit ANY mistakes. This preparation should be centered mainly on two fields:

- a. General knowledge about the country, its population, traditions, customs, political and military context and finally the spirit and content of the ARUSHA Peace Agreement.
- b. All participants should (*illegible*) the mentality of a "peacekeeper" which is different from that of a "peacemaker". It is crucial that this difference is articulated to avoid, on the one hand, being counter-productive, and on the other hand, frustrations of the personnel.

In another field, I believe that the personnel should be aware that they are in RWANDA to work and not to benefit from the "delights of Capone", as this point of view is totally different. Even where the personnel could relax during their mission, this should not in any way overshadow the work.

3. Tac Preparation

This preparation should go hand in hand with the psychological preparation. The attitude to be adopted by soldiers involved in a Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) is quite specific. It is out of place to threaten someone by pointing a weapon at him, whilst this is not called for. During this preparation, the personnel should be made to understand that not carrying a weapon like the English in ULSTER is not necessarily dishonour.

4. The functions of the QG

Importance of the choice of personnel of the QGs. The BE is judged through this personnel. Very good knowledge of English essential. All the documents are written and meetings held in that language.

The BE should be attentive to the functions targeted, given that the multi-national framework of UN operations requires particular attention to be devoted to the destiny of the national Detachment.

QG Force: G3 and G4 functions.

QG Secteur: - maintain control over Secteur (at all costs).
 - it would be beneficial to provide for the function of Senior Duty Officer in future.
 - The post of Duty Officer could be occupied by a Cdt. 50.

Important Observation

The Detachment Commander (BE) should be assisted at all costs by assistants appointed by the BE. As for me, 50% of my time is occupied by problems of the BE Detachment. This state of affairs is unbearable. It's been approximately one month that I had requested for reinforcement.

5. Log Assistance (Illegible)

A similar situation occurred at UNPROFO, UNOSOM and once again at UNAMIR as regards accommodation. The first Detachment of each operation encountered serious problems relating to their installation, accommodation, sanitary and laundry issues, all of which have an impact on the output of the personnel.

Would this not be the appropriate time to institute a study at (*illegible*) in order to determine how this recurrent problem could be resolved?

6. Budgetary Matters

Such operations require national defence budgets, which is not an easy task. Generally speaking the personnel should be sensitized about this field so that each of them, within their own field, would be concerned about reducing operational costs to the minimum. One area where savings could be made is in transmissions. In effect, a lot of documents are sent via satellite whilst they are not required urgently. Moreover, there are 3 airline connections per week between Brussels and Kigali, in addition to the C-130 shuttles.

The proliferation of satellite installations, which are not justified given the circumstances, would, *de facto*, inflate the operational costs. The Commander of the UNAMIR Detachment (BE) has to cater for certain obligations which (*Next two lines illegible*) given the position it occupies in KIGALI. Would it not be possible to create a limited budget for such operations?

7. Policy in Terms of Logistics Stocks

Very soon the Detachment will have at its disposal an important stock of all categories of logistics supplies. Where will those stocks be taken to in the event of evacuation or early departure of UNAMIR? Directives should be given in that regard.

8. Evacuation of Expatriate Community

Even though the evacuation of the expatriate community is incorporated in the general UNAMIR evacuation plan, what will be the attitude of the UNAMIR (BE) Detachment if the evacuation does not go according to plans

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and if the expatriates of the Belgian community could not be evacuated before the departure of the UN troops?

On the other hand, in the event of the early departure of UNAMIR, would the community of expatriates be without external protection even with the protection of the Belgians?

9. (Illegible) Assistance

Calculated risks could be taken in a lot of fields. I believe that the *(Illegible)* assistance should be excluded from such hypothesis.