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Document 81:

US Government Policy

US document from Arlene Render to Mr. Moose; 11 April 1994; Subject: Political Strategy for Rwanda

30598

DRAFT - never used

DENIED IN
~~BS~~

April 11 1994

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DECL: OADR

TO: AF - Mr. Moose
THROUGH: AF - Ms. Bushnell
FROM: AF/C - Arlene Render
SUBJECT: Political Strategy for Rwanda

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(R)

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

- o We do not know who shot down President Habyarimana's plane, but at this point the question is largely academic. The important point is what followed the plane's downing.
- o In the hours and days after the plane went down, the Presidential Guard, other elements of the GOR military, and Hutu extremist militia members massacred Tutsis and executed moderate Hutu opposition leaders.
- o In response, the RPF went on the offensive. It now has the military momentum and is bent on avenging the mass killing of Tutsis and execution of opposition politicians.
- o The new provisional government is led by a septugenarian interim President (Theodore Sindikubwabo) who is a longtime member of Habyarimana's MRND party, and a Prime Minister (Jean Kambanda) who belongs to the hardline Hutu extremist wing of the opposition MDR party. Kambanda's faction has never reconciled with the more moderate wing of the MDR led by Prime Minister-designate Faustin Twagiramungu (~~whereabouts unknown~~) and former Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana (executed on April 7).

Despite the rightist bent of the new provisional government, the interim President said he supports negotiations with the RPF and announced the government's intention to go forward with formation of the transition government provided for in the Arusha accord.

The RPF categorically rejects the legitimacy of the new government and plans to take Kigali and "restore order". They have shown no desire to talk and reject any ceasefire except perhaps to facilitate evacuation of expatriates.

The international community is evacuating and the future of UNAMIR is in doubt.

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARPA)

Exemptions

ARPA Action Cert. *[Signature]* Date 8/15/92

Release
 Excise
 Deny

Declaratory
 Declaratory in Form
 Class. Rev/Renew

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97 D241 #1879
'94 Rwanda Briefing Pa

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LIKELY FUTURE SCENARIO

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The RPF will probably wait for the evacuation of foreigners to be completed before launching any full scale assault on Kigali. The rebels will either succeed in taking Kigali or a military stalemate will result. (It is unlikely that the GOR forces will defeat the RPF.) If the RPF gains a quick military victory, it will probably be unable to govern the overwhelmingly Hutu population. Thus, whether the RPF rolls to "victory" or a military stalemate ensues, the RPF will probably have to accept some form of powersharing with Hutu political forces. The relative military strengths of each side at the time that fighting dies down would presumably determine who gets what percentage share of the power. In either case, powersharing negotiations based on the Arusha agreements would still be possible.

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING OUR POLICY

- o We are not writing off Rwanda. We intend to stay engaged and to help Rwanda ultimately find, peace, stability, and democracy.
- o Our long-term political goal should be to see Rwanda return to the Arusha formula of powersharing leading to democratic multiparty elections.

SHORT TERM STRATEGY (Immediate/this month)

Our immediate/short-term goal is to assure the safety of all Americans and to see that the fighting stops.

- o We should complete evacuation of all Americans wishing to leave (job essentially completed) and monitor progress of evacuation of other foreigners.
- o We should support a continuing UNAMIR presence to mediate a new ceasefire. (The future of UNAMIR is addressed below.)
- o We should urge the RPF, through Museveni, to agree to a new ceasefire (if for no other reason than on humanitarian grounds). At the same time, we should caution Museveni against aiding the RPF.
- o We should make clear to both sides and to our French and Belgian allies that we believe that peace is still possible based on the Arusha formula.

Done
Done
Done -
to
interview
Done

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MEDIUM TERM STRATEGY (Next 3 months)

Our medium term goal is to revive the Arusha process to reach a political settlement on a transitional government.

Done
Done
Done
to continue

- o The UN should not pull out entirely. Rather, it should shift its focus from military to political operations. After negotiating a new ceasefire, UNAMIR should take the lead in mediating political discussions building on Arusha.
- o The bulk of the UN peacekeeping contingent should be withdrawn because their original mission (securing Kigali, keeping the forces separated, and overseeing force integration) has become impossible to fulfill under current circumstances.
- o A small contingent of UN troops should stay to protect the UN's political operation. The Belgian blue berets are not a good choice to stay on, since they are viewed as pro-RPF and are subject to further attacks from Hutu extremists. (At least 12 Belgian soldiers have already been killed.)
- o Continue to put pressure on the RPF, through the GOU, and the GOR, through remaining Western Embassies, to install a broad-based transition government.
- o Monitor the security situation through other Western Embassies and the UN, with a view to resuming Embassy operations with a core staff.

LONGER-TERM STRATEGY (3 Months and Beyond)

- o If the security situation permits, resume Embassy operations. The Ambassador would resume his role in fostering dialogue between the two sides intended to facilitate formation of the transition government.
- o The Embassy would closely coordinate its political efforts on the ground with those of UNAMIR and the rest of the diplomatic corps.
- o Examine options for a confidence-building multilateral military presence of some kind, such as the OAU or a re-expanded UN contingent, to allow for security for the transition government and, ultimately, force integration.

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LIKELY FUTURE SCENARIO

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PRINCIPLES GOVERNING OUR POLICY

- o We are not writing off Rwanda. We intend to stay engaged and to help Rwanda ultimately find, peace, stability, and democracy.
- o Our long-term political goal should be to see Rwanda return to the Arusha formula of powersharing leading to democratic multiparty elections.

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Our immediate/short-term goal is to assure the safety of all Americans and to see that the fighting stops.

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- o We should urge the RPF, through Museveni, to agree to a new ceasefire (if for no other reason than on humanitarian grounds). At the same time, we should caution Museveni against aiding the RPF.
- o We should make clear to both sides and to our French and Belgian allies that we believe that peace is still possible based on the Arusha formula *with modified terms*

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MEDIUM TERM STRATEGY (Next 3 months)

Our medium term goal is to revive the Arusha process to reach a political settlement on a transitional government.

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- o A small contingent of UN troops should stay to protect the UN's political operation. The Belgian blue berets are not a good choice to stay on, since they are viewed as pro-RPF and are subject to further attacks from Hutu extremists. (At least 12 Belgian soldiers have already been killed.)
- o Continue to put pressure on the RPF, through the GOU, and the GOR, through remaining Western Embassies, to install a broad-based transition government.
- o Monitor the security situation through other Western Embassies and the UN, with a view to resuming Embassy operations with a core staff. *UNAMIR* *only if the RPF is open to a political process*

LONGER-TERM STRATEGY (3 Months and Beyond)

- o If the security situation permits, resume Embassy operations. The Ambassador would resume his role in fostering dialogue between the two sides intended to facilitate formation of the transition government. *to a political process* *status* *mandate*
- o The Embassy would closely coordinate its political efforts on the ground with those of UNAMIR and the rest of the diplomatic corps.
- o Examine options for a confidence-building multilateral military presence of some kind, such as the OAU or a re-expanded UN contingent, to allow for security for the transition government and, ultimately, force integration.

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LIKELY FUTURE SCENARIO

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*In spite of the fact
the RPF has indicated
the Arusha would be done*

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING OUR POLICY

- o We are not writing off Rwanda. We intend to stay engaged and to help Rwanda ultimately find, peace, stability, and democracy. *90%
100%*
- o Our long-term political goal should be to see Rwanda return to the Arusha formula of powersharing leading to democratic multiparty elections.

SHORT TERM STRATEGY (Immediate/this month)

Our immediate/short-term goal is to assure the safety of all Americans and to see that the fighting stops.

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- o We should urge the RPF, through Museveni, to agree to a new ceasefire (if for no other reason than on humanitarian grounds). At the same time, we should caution Museveni *to* against aiding the RPF. *Feels*
- o We should make clear to both sides and to our French and Belgian allies that we believe that peace is still possible based on the Arusha formula. *with* *insufficient*

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